"Innere Fuehrung"--a superior concept of leadership by Lux, Michael G.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2008-06
"Innere Fuehrung"--a superior concept of leadership
Lux, Michael G.













Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 
INNERE FUEHRUNG –  








 Thesis Advisor:   Donald Abenheim 
 Second Reader: Werner Freistetter 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2008 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
 Innere Fuehrung – A Superior Concept of Leadership 
6. AUTHOR(S) 
Michael G. Lux   
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This study describes the inner design of military forces in a German democracy—Innere Fuehrung—in the face of new 
challenges. “Transformation” and its various manifestations, including EBAO and NCW/NCO are contrasted with Innere 
Fuehrung. Differences of contemporary NATO, U.S., and German concepts are discussed and possible connection points for 
Innere Fuehrung are highlighted. 
Some of the approaches examined are dominated by the extensive use of technology. The analysis is focused on a 
possible contradiction between technology and Innere Fuehrung as an enabler of successful interagency cooperation.  
The study concludes that Innere Fuehrung is a guiding principle based on the application of the German constitution, the 
Basic Law, to the reality of soldierly service. In contrast to Transformation or RMA, Innere Fuehrung emphasizes the human being 
as a citizen rather than technology as tools of war. Innere Fuehrung constitutes the heart of the Bundeswehr’s institutional culture 
and remains applicable in the present. Citizens in uniform at home in the pluralism of state and society are best able to adapt to the 
security and defense challenges of the present—in contrast to an exclusive military caste or an outsourced mercenary horde. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
129 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 
 Innere Fuehrung, Transformation, Effects Based Approach to Operations, EBAO, Revolution of 
Military Affairs, RMA, “citizen in uniform”, Germany, NATO, mercenaries, ethics, guiding 
philosophy, German Basic Law, CAFJO, soldierly values, pluralism, state, society, conscript forces, 
institutional culture 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
“INNERE FUEHRUNG”–  
A SUPERIOR CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP 
 
 
Michael G. Lux 
Major, German Air Force 
Diplom – Staatswissenschaftler (Univ.), 
Diploma’d Political and Social Scientist, 




Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 









Author:   Michael G. Lux 
 
 








Dr. Harold A. Trinkunas 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This study describes the inner design of military forces in a German democracy—
Innere Fuehrung—in the face of new challenges. “Transformation” and its various 
manifestations, including EBAO and NCW/NCO are contrasted with Innere Fuehrung. 
Differences of contemporary NATO, U.S., and German concepts are discussed and 
possible connection points for Innere Fuehrung are highlighted. 
Some of the approaches examined are dominated by the extensive use of 
technology. The analysis is focused on a possible contradiction between technology and 
Innere Fuehrung as an enabler of successful interagency cooperation.  
The study concludes that Innere Fuehrung is a guiding principle based on the 
application of the German constitution, the Basic Law, to the reality of soldierly service. 
In contrast to Transformation or RMA, Innere Fuehrung emphasizes the human being as 
a citizen rather than technology as tools of war. Innere Fuehrung constitutes the heart of 
the Bundeswehr’s institutional culture and remains applicable in the present. Citizens in 
uniform at home in the pluralism of state and society are best able to adapt to the security 
and defense challenges of the present—in contrast to an exclusive military caste or an 
outsourced mercenary horde.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
Innere Fuehrung defies translation into English, but it has become a trade mark of 
the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, since the debut in 1953 of the term and the 
formal articulation of the ideas of an ethically motivated citizen-soldier for which it 
stands.1   Why should one care about such a term or concept, when its very definition 
offers only problems, or worse leads to difficult conversations instead of simple, catchy 
answers?  Furthermore why should a member of an allied military force, with its own 
successful democratic traditions and integration of the soldier in society care, about this 
barely pronounceable German principle?  Since 2002, much invective has circulated 
among NATO allies about chocolate nations and their marzipan armies, in which the 
contrast between the storied soldierly chops of the Nazi-era Wehrmacht and the bearded, 
vacation-minded Bundeswehr redounds to the detriment of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (though typically without much regard to the nature of the society that each 
army served or of the role of the soldiers in those very different Germanies).  This study 
is intended to address this misconception in a manner that sheds more light than dark on 
both the German experience of Innere Fuehrung and its applicability among allied forces. 
One might begin with a definition of what Innere Fuehrung is not, by way of 
introducing this complex topic. Innere Fuehrung means that the soldier in democracy—
the citizen in uniform—must not serve or defend any regime, ruler, or ideology with 
                                                 
1 Although the White Paper 2006 of the Federal Government of Germany (hereinafater White Paper 
2006) refers to Innere Fuehrung as “leadership development and civic education,” to the term, in fact, 
resists easy translation into English. In fact, this term describes a whole construct of ideas that, together, 
mean nothing less than the incorporation of the values of the German Basic Law, the Grundgesetz, into 
every German soldier’s daily judgment and action. White Paper 2006; 
http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/sicherheitspolitik/grundlagen/weissbuch2006 (accessed November 26, 
2007).10. 
 2
unconditional obedience against the best of one’s knowledge.2  Born out of the need to 
reconcile pluralism and liberal democracy with soldierly honor and service (especially as 
these issues showed themselves in the era 1890–1945) the founding fathers of the 
Bundeswehr put forward Innere Fuehrung as a counterpoint to the political abuse by—
and of—soldiers in National Socialism. 3 Additionally Innere Fuehrung was seen as a 
means to reformulate military professionalism in a democracy, a feat that heretofore had 
never worked in Germany. This concept, sometimes described as a leadership 
philosophy, became a major success story despite a rocky start in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Innere Fuehrung made generations of Bundeswehr soldiers proud and dedicated servants 
of the Federal Republic of Germany. Throughout the cold war, Innere Fuehrung offered a 
common identity and a sense of service to a just cause. Furthermore, it equipped the 
Bundeswehr soldier to resist anti-democratic ideologies.  
1. Purpose 
More than five decades after the founding of the Bundeswehr in 1955, the security 
environment and the image of war have changed dramatically. Bipolarity is long gone, 
and transnational terrorists have emerged as a major threat. The present study treats the 
evolution, character, and prospects of Innere Fuehrung in the radically altered security 
and defense context of the twenty-first century.  The main research question asks: Is the 
concept of Innere Fuehrung still relevant in contemporary conditions as faced by the 
                                                 
2 This negative definition does not differ greatly from what we usually would consider as common 
sense, formed by existing laws and ethical criteria. Neither does such a collection of ethical criteria differ a 
lot from the incorporation of such concepts into the military forces of most of the Western or “modern” 
states. The idea is normal only in a settled participatory democracy, however. In the German case, one see 
the difference in the formulation of the oath of allegiance to the Federal Republic of Germany—with the 
attendant vow to serve the German nation loyally and bravely to defend its rights and freedom—that career 
soldiers in the Bundeswehr swore in the first years of the German post-war democracy (in contrast to the 
idea of absolute obedience that obtained during the Third Reich).  In the event, conscripts participated in a 
ceremonial obligation, even less automatic obedience for the citizen draftees. Donald Abenheim, 
Bundeswehr und Tradition: Die Suche nach dem gueltigen Erbe des deutschen Soldaten. Muenchen: 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1989. 116. 
3 See, e.g., Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640–1945. London et al.: Oxford 
University Press, 1964; Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard 
University Press, 1998; David K. Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 
1944–945. Lawrence (Kan.): University of Kansas Press, 2002. 
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German Bundeswehr?4  An additional subset of questions, related to this major topic, 
concerns the possible application of Innere Fuehrung in present and future Bundeswehr 
operations, especially in a multilateral environment. Such a multilateral environment 
increasingly becomes a multi-value environment, which in turn affects the values of all 
sides.5 The shape of such operations therefore also should be of great concern.  
Other questions deal with the construct of Innere Fuehrung itself. Here the focus 
will be directed to the quality of personnel needed and the appropriate selection of 
personnel able to cope with the new challenges while maintaining the primacy of the 
principles of Innere Fuehrung.6   
2. Importance 
This thesis advances an understanding of how the concept of Innere Fuehrung has 
worked, as well as the challenges for this concept in contemporary military operations. 
Particular attention is given to the so-called Effects-Based Approach to Operations 
(EBAO).  Without describing or defining this approach in detail at this early stage of this 
study, it can be noted that EBAO addresses the strategic level in order to combine the 
available capabilities of all agencies and organizations—military and civil—acting 
simultaneously rather than sequentially in a specific engagement space. A more refined 
attempt to define EBAO and its derivations is provided in Chapter III. 
                                                 
4 Various armies in Europe have adopted key features of Innere Fuehrung. A broader, comparative 
study—which among others things would have to parse the features selected and the degree to which these 
features were incorporated amid a thorough analysis of the respective societies—exceeds the scope of the 
present work. The necessary data may not exist or be accessible. Furthermore this study assumes that while 
certain principles of Innere Fuehrung are transferable, Innere Fuehrung itself is hard to copy because it has 
developed for more than five decades and still is developing each day.  
5 The role of mutual cultural awareness, so-called “intercultural competency,” is important and is 
partly discussed in Chapter III. This thesis focuses mainly on Innere Fuehrung as the “home” culture that 
shapes the reality and the political context of the Bundeswehr. Other partners or agencies must contend 
with just this reality.   
6 The German news magazine Spiegel published on its online version on November 20, 2006, the 
summary of the contemporary discussion. Despite a sexy title, purportedly an unattributed quote, the whole 
article draws a rather dubious outline. Konstantin von Hammerstein, Hans Hoyng, Hans-Jürgen Schlamp, 
and Alexander Szandar, “The Germans Have to Learn How to Kill,” 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,449479,00.html  accessed April 16 2008. 
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The founding fathers of the Bundeswehr deemed it necessary to provide the 
soldiers of the young Federal Republic of Germany with a value-based concept, including 
the famous idea of the “citizen in uniform” as a guideline. In important ways, this 
enlightened and empowered citizen soldier is particularly well equipped to operate 
effectively and ethically within the multilateral, even internally competitive, realm of 
EBAO and other such approaches to interoperability. 
B. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
Whether Innere Fuehrung can be seen as a fundamental philosophy or a concept 
of ethics based on the democratic values embodied in the German constitution is partly 
answered by the closer examination of the institutions of command, obedience, and 
morale in the German experience.  Each soldier is obligated perpetually to reassess his 
decisions, behavior, and actions based on the constitutional and legal aspects of his 
mission. He or she does so to avoid the abuses of human rights that have been repugnant 
features of the past and the present. The main aim here is to prevent German soldiers 
from once more becoming tools of oppression.   
More recent scandals of other nations, where regular soldiers knowingly did 
inhuman things to other humans, suggests that this topic is still of great interest.7 The 
recent Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo detention camp scandals, as well as the willingness 
of many U.S. political and military leaders to accept this obvious moral and legal 
injustice, suggest that the epoch of military Transformation and a changing security 
environment requires a renewed validation of military discipline and morale on the basis  
                                                 
7 A subjective or even biased description of such mechanisms conducted in order to defend a 
democracy can be found in Moazzam Begg’s book, Enemy Combatant, where Begg describes his 
imprisonment at Guantanamo. One must realize that in such an environment, the traces of cause and effect 
easily can get lost for both sides, activating a further downward spiral.  Moazzam Begg, Enemy Combatant: 
My Imprisonment at Guantanamo, Bagram, and Kandahar. New York: The New Press, 2006.  
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of democratic values.8  Soldierly and professional values—be they Western or 
universal—cannot be defended by their neglect or willful destruction in the name of the 
needs of security.9  
Innere Fuehrung seeks to prevent the depersonalization that is the prelude to 
atrocity in military service.  At the same time, one must say that Innere Fuehrung has 
hardly been foolproof and specific controversies in the history of the Bundeswehr 
underscore this fact. Various (and variously hair-raising) scandals of the soldier and 
constitutional norms periodically appeared in the five decades of the existence of the 
Bundeswehr. Almost every decade saw such an event.10 Nagold in 1963, Coesfeld in 
2004, or the “skull affair” in Afghanistan in 2006 are only the most prominent names of 
these scandals. The content of these scandals and their effects on the Bundeswehr and its 
inner structure must be mentioned and examined. While the scandals are entirely 
inexcusable, this study shows that they all were endeavors of some misguided individuals 
and not some large-scale antidemocratic and inhuman operations sanctioned from the 
senior levels of command. These events were neither organized nor authorized nor 
encouraged by any higher authority. Individual failure in leadership usually was the main 
cause. Another commonality can be seen in the fact that none of these events could be 
covered behind the barrack’s gate. Public interest as well as the principle of Innere 
Fuehrung prevented—if there where such tendencies at all—such attempts of 
misunderstood camaraderie.   
Mention of these scandals underscores the basic idea that Innere Fuehrung is not a 
product that can be applied off the shelf; rather Innere Fuehrung is a process that relies on 
                                                 
8  For the purpose of this thesis, “Transformation” is written with a capital letter. Transformation in 
this sense includes adaptations to new technologies and operational requirements and shall be characteristic 
for the worldwide movement noticeable in western military organizations since the late1990s. 
9 The central field manual ZDv 10/1 as of January 2008 states in No. 604: “Wer Menschenwuerde 
verteidigt muss Menschen wuerdig behandeln.” (Whoever defends human dignity must treat humans with 
dignity). A more thorough discussion of this subject is provided in Chapter II. A solid foundation for the 
discussion of this point can be found at: Werner Freistetter, “Conscience and Authority—Virtues and 
Pitfalls of Military Obedience.” http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/08_cma_05_frei.pdf 
accessed May 05 2008.  29.   
10 An incomplete list for the last two decades can be found at 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,444655,00.html accessed April 23 2008. 
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education and training as well as a reality of military service.  To be sure, this high 
ethical standard derived from the process Innere Fuehrung demands a thorough military 
education as well as a competent and permanent training program and a careful selection 
of personnel so as to avoid those figures likely to abuse their soldiers and others. It is also 
very important to differentiate between the seeming limitations of Innere Fuehrung and 
its real limitations. Innere Fuehrung most certainly is not a perfect remedy, but similarly, 
even the most scrupulous practice of Innere Fuehrung cannot ensure that individuals will 
not engage in unethical behavior while in uniform. 
Innere Fuehrung though is very likely to limit the work of such misguided persons 
and bring it to public attention by the means provided. These means are the legal 
possibilities anchored, among other things, in three codes pertaining to soldiers in 
Germany: the Wehrbeschwerdeordnung, the Wehrdisziplinarordnung, and the 
Soldatengesetz.11 It is the relentless promotion of this network of guaranteed and 
protected rights and duties that marks the successful backbone of Innere Fuehrung. 
Furthermore each soldier must understand and evaluate his or her orders within 
the frame of military discipline.12 Being a “citizen in uniform” acts as a prophylactic 
remedy to atrocity and antidemocratic deeds. The idea of a citizen in uniform should not 
be misunderstood as a “soldier being a citizen.” The latter constitutes what Innere 
Fuehrung tries to preclude: soldiers as a functional caste, a state within the state.  The 
emphasis therefore remains on the citizen and hence the rights provided by the German 
                                                 
11 The dictionary offers for Wehrbeschwerdeordnung the term “military grievance code”; for 
Wehrdisziplinarordnung, one could use “military disciplinary code,” while Soldatengesetz might be 
translated as “military code” or “soldier’s law.” In Appendix 2 of the current central field manual ZDv 
10/1, five pages are dedicated to the rights and duties of all soldiers of the Bundeswehr and the relationship 
of the Basic Rights of the German Basic Law to the above-mentioned codes. Appendix 2 not only lists the 
curtailed rights of soldiers but briefly explains why they are curtailed. Additionally it emphasizes the duties 
of Bundeswehr soldiers, but it also clearly states the limitations of these duties. A special focus is directed 
towards the limitations of obedience and the resulting duties for superiors. (Central field manual ZDv 10/1, 
App. 2/2, 4.) For example, the note that active soldiers retain the right to vote actually expresses the 
intention that soldiers actively should take part in politics in order to perform their duties as a informed 
soldiers of a democratic and pluralistic society in the true sense of Innere Fuehrung.  Rolf Clement and Paul 
E. Joeris, 50 Jahre Bundeswehr : 1955 bis 2005. Hamburg et al.: Mittler, 2005. 89. 
12 For the purpose of this study in reference to the Bundeswehr, the noun “soldier” includes all 
soldiers, i.e. male and female.  This task can be directly derived from various numbers in the ZDv 10/1.  
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Basic Law are curtailed only to a minimum.13  The German Parliament made sure that 
each soldier is encouraged to take part in the active life of a citizen. In turn, his political 
duties enable the soldier to detect wrongdoing without the fear of oppression. Ideally in 
the result is a system of military checks and balances which creates an environment of 
mutual trust and respect. Further, Innere Fuehrung provides ample chances so that it is 
most likely that no soldier is hung out to dry with the assessment of his mission.14 On the 
other side, such a system based on the values of a mature and responsible citizen leads to 
officers who—while giving orders—will act as a corrective factor, if they detect any 
conflict with their conscience. 
1. Context 
The concept of Innere Fuehrung was introduced more than five decades ago at the 
time of a West Germany contribution to Atlantic defense and in the wake of the 
Wehrmacht in National Socialism. On the one hand it was supposed to insure to the 
Belgians and the French of the completely different nature of the new German military 
forces; on the other hand, it also truly tried to provide answers about how future German 
soldiers could be an organic part of the society of the Federal Republic of Germany with 
a working democratic control over armed forces.  Innere Fuehrung in its first years served 
the democratic legitimacy, based on a consensus throughout society, in order to justify 
the armed forces in the face of stiff internal and international opposition to the 
remilitarizing of Germany. At its inception, the West Germans were at pains to make 
clear to the NATO allies that Innere Fuehrung was not intended for export, since the 
Americans, British and French have followed a different path of democratic integration 
of their forces.  
                                                 
13 The English translation of the German Basic Law is derived from the following English version:   
http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/parliament/function/legal/germanbasiclaw.pdf accessed May 01 2008. 
14 This assumption is backed by the author’s own experiences of almost two decades of serving in the 
Bundeswehr. Different perspectives gained from being a conscripted soldier and a professional soldier, 
various ranks and levels of responsibility, and different branches within the German Air Force add further 
statistic “n” to this view. Despite some frictions one generally can experience while interacting with other 
human beings and different personalities the vast majority of own experiences prove that statement. 
Nevertheless, as Freistetter argues, it is clear that “the final answer to questions of this kind will always 
have to be given by every individual human being alone, listening to the voice of his or her personal 
conscience.” Freistetter, Conscience and Authority. 35. 
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Another aim of this thesis is to determine whether the Bundeswehr still follows its 
own guiding principles, or if in the face of Transformation,  Innere Fuehrung has become 
a mere mask of public relations or even worse an obstacle. This thesis will illuminate the 
close relationship of Innere Fuehrung and the Bundeswehr as a conscript force in the 
aspect that conscripts play a vital democratic role in the life of the armed forces.    
Today such concepts or conceptual frameworks as “asymmetric warfare,”15 
“Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA), “Network Centric Warfare” (NCW), 
“Transformation,” or EBAO now seem to dictate the military future:   
 Such an effects based approach should be developed further and might 
include enhancing situational awareness, timely operational planning and 
decision making, improving links between commanders, sensors and 
weapons, and deploying and employing joint expeditionary forces 
coherently and to greatest effect.16 
 
At the Riga Summit in November 2006, the NATO heads of state and government 
expressed in their “Comprehensive Political Guidance,” that is, the alliance’s need for an 
“effects-based approach,” commonly referred to as EBAO. Another term on the same 
level for this kind of approach is the so-called Comprehensive Approach (CA), which 
was endorsed by the NATO heads of state and government in the Riga Summit 
Declaration.17 These terms are part of a key concept for NATO for the transformation of 
the allied forces in order to operate successfully in the new strategic environment.  A 
closer examination is provided in Chapter III. 
Often mentioned in combination with EBAO is Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 
in its different varieties. Although NCW addresses by definition mainly another level of 
analysis, it is relevant to this thesis because it is connected to transformation and 
                                                 
15 In a close connotation with the observed asymmetric warfare the concept of “Counter Insurgency” 
(COIN) is often promulgated as the appropriate answer. This study recognizes the existence of this 
discussion. However, COIN can be viewed rather as a tool than an approach like EBAO or a method like 
NCW and hence is not the same level. 
16 Comprehensive Political Guidance; Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 
November 2006 at the Riga Summit: Part 2, par.17. 
17  NATO website: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm accessed March 2008. 
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therefore constitutes another characteristic feature of the Western military operations in 
the twenty-first century. The U.S. interpretation of the Revolution in Military Affairs, as 
well as Transformation, places too great an emphasis on the hegemony of technology in 
the eyes of some observers.18 The proponents of transformation in the U.S. forces poorly 
appreciate the factor of ideology since September 11, and, as such, an analysis of Innere 
Fuehrung casts light on the impact on present conflict of what is called the inner structure 
of armed forces.19 This question has relevance for not only Germans, but also for others.   
 The soldier’s ability to meet the high demands at every level of modern 
operations is crucial to the success of a tactical mission as well as to the success of a 
whole operation. Never before in history could media have covered a single action in the 
ways that are possible today. More than ever one soldier can have remarkable effects on 
the outcome of a whole operation.20 This raises the question whether the operational 
concepts are right as well as whether the personnel have been properly selected, 
educated, trained and prepared for their mission.  
Trusting in the soldier’s competence and reliability becomes more and more 
important. Education in its widest sense in this case becomes more crucial than the focus 
on technology. Although it is a prudent approach in order to protect one’s one soldiers 
                                                 
18 Critique on an overall level on that topic for example can be found at: Abenheim, Donald. Soldier 
and Politics Transformed: German-American Reflections on Civil-Military Relations in a New Strategic 
Environment. Berlin: Miles, 2007. 224. EBO related critique can be found at: Milan N. Vego, “Effects-
Based Operations: A critique.” In: Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ), issue 42, 2nd quarter 2006, S. 51-57. 
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/. 
19 Paul Yingling, “General Failure: America’s Military leadership is in Crisis,” Armed Forces Journal 
(May 2007), 17–23. 
20 The examples and the connected effects of the intended or unintended use of modern low cost 
recording devices provided by almost any mediocre mobile phone and the instant propagation via platforms 
offered by the World Wide Web are ample and can be devastating to any cause. Whether the shown clips 
are real or not does not matter since people want to believe what they see. Even if such images prove to be 
definitely wrong and staged, the harm is done since any answer would likely be perceived as counter-
propaganda at first hand. For the role of propaganda and its appeals see: Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the 
Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day. 3rd ed. Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press, 2003.  
Such mechanisms become more and more important while interacting with other cultures and their 
views. A simple prohibition of such devices in the field is not sufficient enough. The necessary capacity to 
understand the wrongfulness of such an act committed out of various motives ranging from a foolish and 
impudent prank, pompousness or simple maliciousness must be reached via education. By no means there 
should be a connection in a sense that Innere Fuehrung would cure this since even in its ideal form Innere 
Fuehrung can only constitute a sound basis and not the one fits all solution. 
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and enhance their efficiency to equip them with the best technology available and 
beyond, it will forever remain an illusion to control any battlefield totally with zero losses 
and minor collateral damage. This self-evident truth must shape the mind of the 
responsible decision makers, as well as of those soldiers in charge in order to prevent 
them from becoming submissive henchmen of wrong political decisions. 
Admittedly, this goal requires not only the personality and ability to judge such 
decisions, but also the appropriate framework where such criticism can be exercised 
without fearing harm. 21 Innere Fuehrung is intended to constitute such a framework and 
is supposed to enable the respective officers in charge to develop the needed political 
expertise.        
Additionally in the aftermath of present military operations there seems to be a 
trend to favor outsourcing of security and support tasks to “private companies,” which, in 
this author’s view, constitute modern mercenaries. Despite their assumed and yet not 
proven (cost) effectiveness, these defense contractors and modern mercenaries might well 
                                                 
21 A recent case study showing the complexity of such an endeavor can be found at Martin L.Cook, 
“Revolt of the Generals: A case study in Professional Ethics.” Parameters, Spring 2008. 
www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/08spring/contents3.htm accessed May 3, 2008. 
Triggered by the famous inflammatory Paul Yingling article about the “General Failure,” Wade Markel 
writes in the same publication about the limits of American generalship in the “arena of national strategy” 
and its strategic advices in the early Cold War crises. From comparing the situation in Korea 1951 and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, he concludes that then the generals out of a lack of political experience 
would have given dangerous advice and that until today it is therefore highly advisable for American 
generals to take care of their business, i.e., guaranteeing the mere functioning of military forces. It is 
exactly this complete separation from the mind of a citizen who is required to act as a citizen from the mind 
of the military specialist that is so frightening.  
Admittedly, Markel concludes that due to the political inexperience in combination with the focus on their 
military expertise of these generals simply would not have been able to give any other advice as they did. 
Still such a focus on the functionality of a specialized caste and the resulting conclusions are more than 
questionable and are a terrifying signal in the face of the reasons why a concept like Innere Fuehrung was 
introduced and still is a highly valued asset. Wade Markel, “The Limits of American Generalship: The 
JCS’s Strategic Advice in Early Cold War Crises.” Parameters, Spring 2008. 
www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/08spring/contents3.htm accessed May 3, 2008. 
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cause more harm than good.22 They clearly operate outside the well-tried channels of 
military discipline or justice. Additionally, from a German point of view, they are not 
bound to the high moral standards that the German concept of Innere Fuehrung requires 
and hence such contractors offer no real alternative to regular forces.23 
2.   Literature 
In general, the thesis design allows a grouping of the available literature into two 
major topic blocks, namely Innere Fuehrung and Transformation. The latter is divided 
into EBAO and NCW/NCO. Furthermore, many sources are available in both German 
and English, which adds to the abundance of useful literature. Additionally, the 
complexity of this topic calls for an interdisciplinary approach. Therefore, history, 
political science, and sociology offer ample literature. 
a.  Innere Fuehrung   
The principle of Innere Fuehrung cannot be discussed without a thorough 
historical analysis. Such reflection on history, however, in this thesis shall lead to 
understanding and the definition of important distinctions of key terms. Looking back 
into history, analyzing cases, and trying to understand with the advantage of hindsight 
why things turned out in a certain fashion is in general a prudent approach. Studying 
                                                 
22 Interesting figures about the cost of wars for example in Iraq and Afghanistan only for the United 
States can be derived from the CQ Researcher, vol.18, no. 16, 361–384. www.cqresearcher.com accessed 
May 4, 2008. Because the human costs are immeasurable on all sides, the focus for this argument is solely 
directed without any cynics to the estimated U.S.-Dollar amounts spent. Additionally there is no evaluation 
taken, whether the money is spent in vain or not. The estimated total costs on these wars range from $2 
trillion to $3 trillion.  Cook, “Revolt of the Generals: A case study in Professional Ethics.” 364. The 
probably most infamous “private security company,” Blackwater, alone is assumed to have been awarded 
$1 billion, by the U.S. government for their engagement in Iraq since 2001.  “U.S.-Verteidigungsminister 
kritisiert Blackwater” (“U.S. Secretary of Defense criticizes Blackwater”) as of October 19, 2007.  
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ausland/artikel/979/138695/  accessed May 8, 2008. 
23 Other indicators for such an argument can be found in the above cited criticism of Secretary Gates. 
After slowly realizing how much money these “private companies” actually cost, the main advantage of 
such mercenaries remains the almost non existing legal accountability compared with the legal restrictions 
regular soldiers face on purpose. Additionally they are not accounted statistically as the officially 
announced more than 4000 dead U.S. troops. The discussion about the use of mercenaries and its possible 
implications on the success of a mission is continued in Chapter III.   
Data derived from CQ Researcher, 363. The arguments shown are derived from Peter Lindner, “Der Krieg 
ist ueberall.” (“War is everywhere”) http://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/artikel/73/139780 accessed May 8, 
2008.  
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history to identify “best practices” and trying to condense events into digestible “lessons 
learned” is an evil of modern times. Therefore, this approach is not selected in this thesis. 
Here history is examined to draw a picture of the then applicable Zeitgeist and to assess 
where and why things have gone terribly wrong or right. 
Further, the record of the German past since 1945 offers an important 
point of contrast to the years that preceded the Third Reich and is also of merit for those 
who reflect on the themes of democratic consolidation and security building. Although 
most of the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr served in the Wehrmacht, it clearly must 
be stated that the Wehrmacht is neither the legal nor the mental forerunner of the 
Bundeswehr.24 Yet these first officers enabled the Bundeswehr to overcome the record 
of the soldier in National Socialism by creating Innere Fuehrung based on their own 
experiences.25  
A remarkable insight into German society rather stumbling into the Third 
Reich than going into it in a planned fashion can be found at Henry Ashby Turner, Jr.26 
He furthermore develops a line of alternatives Germany seemed to have had in these 
crucial days of late 1932 and early 1933, for example a military dictatorship that would 
have prevented the outcome of the Third Reich. Even if one easily can follow Turner’s 
work, one might object to such hypothetic alternatives as counter factualism. 
Nevertheless, Turner manages to show how former soldiers from all ranks were not able 
to perform the roles and proper duties of a politician. A role these soldiers were offered 
based upon the unjustly high prestige the interwar soldiers gained in the face of the 
failure of the Weimar Republic. This very attempt of German democracy they helped to 
burry for own personal purposes while using the infamous “stab in the back” myth. In 
doing so, Turner provides us with deep insights of the German society’s demeanor and 
composition of the 1930s.  
                                                 
24 ZDv 10/1, Vorbemerkung, no. 5. 
25 Hans Speier, “German Rearmament and the Old Military Elite.” World Politics 6, no. 2 (Jan., 
1954): 147–168. 
26 Henry Ashby Turner, Jr. Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power: January 1933. Yale: Basic Books, 1996. 
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An extension of this insight into the German military of the early 1930s as 
of the Wehrmacht in general until its end is provided by Geoffrey P. Megargee.27 History 
is made by humans, their personalities and their decisions based upon their knowledge 
rather than inevitable circumstances. Megargee contributes a great deal to this view of 
decision makers shaping the world. His critical examination of the German General 
Staff—changed from a World War I military force devoted to the Kaiser into a World 
War II military force devoted to the Fuehrer—calls into question the professionalism of 
these officers. He explains some of the catastrophic military misjudgments by casting 
light on the inadequacies stemming from the obvious weakness of character of some 
main players in the small circle of generals surrounding Hitler. Additionally he points out 
that interservice rivalry—partly resulting from the Versailles Peace Treaty limitation of 
numbers of the old Reichswehr and partly credited to the emerging technological 
developments—helped to create tensions that left little time for political contemplation.28 
Megargee further argues that a dramatic quantity problem with the supply of officers and 
hence the connected lowering of entrance standards by 1934–35 helped to turn the 
Wehrmacht into a compliant tool of the National Socialist state.29 Ranks had to be filled 
and ranks were filled. This in turn opened the doors for a number of mediocre and 
actually incompetent officers up to the ranks of a general. The proper display of the right 
party membership book helped to cover rotten characters. With his book, Megargee can 
contribute to a great extend to the main argument in the historical part of this study that 
rejects inevitability. He furthermore helps to demystify the Third Reich and its military 
force. Additionally his findings help to underline the importance Innere Fuehrung 
dedicates to the “inner order” or to be more precise the inner composition of military 
                                                 
27 Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000. 
28 One of the purposes of research of this study is to show that exactly this inability or worse the 
unwillingness of soldiers to reflect on the political implications of a task inevitably leads to catastrophic 
results. This effect is amplified when the influence of an ideology or party covers the remnants of common 
sense and leads to a fatalistic attitude.   
29 Ibid., 31. 
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forces.30 Yet to blame only inadequacies credited to individual biographies would neither 
do justice to Megargee’s book nor to the complexity of his topic. It furthermore would 
neglect the almost diabolical ability of Hitler to manipulate people and his cunningness in 
choosing weak and compliant servants.31  
In order to draw an even clearer picture of this pivotal period additional 
historians and their works selected. Most of them—Omer Bartov, Peter Hoffmann, Jay 
Lockenour, and Gerhard Weinberg—are objective scholars.32 If biased tendencies can be 
observed, then this is credited to the methodology (eyewitness reports) chosen by such 
authors as Mark Mazower and David Kitterman. However, such testimonies add an 
intense and rather personal character and are very valuable.33  
Although a soldier is supposed to obey orders, a perverted form of blind 
obedience led to the catastrophe of the Third Reich. Bartov and others argue that this 
issue was not only a problem soldiers had, but a problem that burdened society as a 
whole.34  This thesis cannot excuse the criminal deeds of German soldiers, time nor does 
it attempt to soften cruelties. However, sociological experiments have shown that 
militarism, authoritarianism, neuroticism and antisocial behaviour are closely related and 
are easy to breed, since at least the first two foster a stable society.35 
                                                 
30 Innere Ordnung in relation to military forces is yet another term that seems too difficult to translate. 
The German original describes partly the inner structure, the inner order and the cohesion of military forces 
in relation to the existing law code and the fulfillment of the task. The ZDv 10/1, No. 401 formulates the 
design of the Innere Ordnung as one of its four main goals.   
31 A legendary example of this ability is the episode how Hitler chooses Wilhelm Keitel (“Lakeitel” 
i.e. lackey) as commander of chief or the Wehrmacht. Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command, 41. 
32 Omer Bartov, “The Conduct of War: Soldiers and the Barbarization of Warfare.” The Journal of 
Modern History 64, no. Supplement: Resistance Against the Third Reich (Dec., 1992): 32–45. Peter 
Hoffmann, “Colonel Claus Von Stauffenberg in the German Resistance to Hitler: Between East and West.” 
The Historical Journal 31, no. 3 (Sep., 1988): 629–650. Jay Lockenour, “The Rift in our Ranks: The 
German Officer Corps, the Twentieth of July, and the Path to Democracy.” German Studies Review 21, no. 
3 (Oct., 1998): 469–506. Gerhard L. Weinberg, “Unexplored Questions about the German Military during 
World War II.” The Journal of Military History 62, no. 2 (Apr., 1998): 371–380.  
33 Mazower, “Military Violence and National Socialist Values.” Kitterman, “Those Who Said “no!” 
34 Omer Bartov, “Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich.” The Journal of Modern History 63, 
no. 1 (Mar., 1991): 44–60. 
35 Ray, John J. “Militarism, Authoritarianism, Neuroticism, and Antisocial Behavior.” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 16, no. 3 (Sep., 1972): 319–340. 
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Most of the accounts reviewed contribute in an elaborated way to the 
historical mosaic. This thesis, though, connects the various pieces in order to determine 
why men did things that they knew were wrong and why they kept doing it. The sole 
reference to the pressure of coercion would be too myopic and a logic shortfall. The roles  
of society and individuals in consideration of the then applicable Zeitgeist are distilled 
from these historical accounts in order to show the path that Innere Fuehrung had to take 
to avoid the same mistakes.36    
The contemporary literature on Innere Fuehrung in German is 
compendious. The description of Innere Fuehrung is derived from official documents 
such as the 2008 edition central field manual ZDv 10/1 Innere Fuehrung that replaced the 
edition of 1993 as this study was being written.37 Relative minor changes in the overall 
content, a few gender related formulations and the acknowledgement of the new 
challenges resulting from the changed security environment constitute the main 
characteristics of the new central field manual.38 Yet the new ZDv 10/1 is more appealing 
than its predecessors since its contemporary style seems to be more accessible. The 
accessibility via electronic means underlines this observation. Given the fact that most of 
the German literature was written before the release of this central field manual and 
hence relates to its predecessors a closer examination of this new document is necessary.  
Being a German and being educated in the very sense of Innere Fuehrung, 
the author might be suspected of being myopic or biased toward this topic. Therefore, the 
recent work of Uwe Hartmann (a luminary of the youngest generation of Innere Fuehrer 
and a graduate of NPS) is used critically to underline current developments in the field of 
                                                 
36 “Zeitgeist” means more than the “spirit of the times.” It takes also into consideration the then 
inherent cultural background of the people. In other words in this German phrase the spirit is connected 
with the time and hence time acts as explanatory function why the spirit was like the way one can see its 
outcomes today.   
37 Its predecessor was released in February 1993 and can be seen as a reaction to the German 
reunification and the absorption of the NVA (National People’s Army) of the ceased German Democratic 
Republic into the Bundeswehr. 
38 For the degree of change one can cite the article of the German Minister of Defence, Dr. Franz 
Josef Jung. “Innere Führung: noch nie war sie so wertvoll wie heute”retrieved from 
http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/ministerium/der_minister?yw_contentURL=/C1256F1200608B1B/W2
7AWGBB605INFODE/content.jsp   accessed May 8, 2008.  
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Innere Fuehrung.39 His book illuminates the successes and deficits of Innere Fuehrung. 
Additionally one can find the current challenges to Innere Fuehrung listed in the end of 
this particular book.40 His credibility stems from his academic background as well as 
from his perspective as an active officer who has served in the field and the highest 
echelons of the Bundeswehr.  
Leading German authorities like Reiner Pommerin (a professor, reserve 
officer and spokesman of the civilian Innere Fuehrung council that advises the Defense 
Ministry) or Uwe Hartmann label this construct a “guiding philosophy.”41 The central 
field manual, ZDv 10/1, also describes Innere Fuehrung as a contributor to such a 
“guiding philosophy.”42 Hartmann also points out that it is rather unlikely to find a short 
and concise definition for this term since Innere Fuehrung in its core is about conviction 
and attitude.43 Yet Innere Fuehrung is not a partisan instrument or part of a partisan 
conviction.44 Such difficulties in finding a handy and easy to carry definition draws the 
outline of chapter II  where instead of offering such definitions of Innere Fuehrung the 
rather long way is taken through describing it via its origins leading to its contemporary 
appearance.   
In order to commemorate the 100th birthday on May 8, 2007, of Wolf 
Count Baudissin, one of the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr as well as the “spiritual” 
father of Innere Fuehrung the German Command and Staff Academy, the 
Fuehrungsakademie in Hamburg held a symposium about the future of Innere 
Fuehrung.45 In the book edited by Elmar Wiesendahl various authors illuminate the 
                                                 
39 Uwe Hartmann, Innere Fuehrung: Erfolge und Defizite der Fuehrungsphilosophie fuer die 
Bundeswehr. Berlin: Miles, 2007. 
40  Uwe Hartmann, Innere Fuehrung: Erfolge und Defizite der Fuehrungsphilosophie fuer die 
Bundeswehr. Berlin: Miles, 2007, 264–266. 
41 Rainer Pommerin, “Exportartikel Innere Fuehrung.” In: if Zeitschrift fuer Innere Fuehrung, Nr. 2-
3/2007.18–21. Hartmann, Innere Fuehrung, 7.  
42 Central field manual ZDv 10/1. Vorbemerkung Nr. 3. 
43 Hartmann, Innere Fuehrung, 207. 
44 Ibid., 114. 
45 The mentioning of Baudissin as the father of Innere Fuehrung often neglects that other men like 
Kielmansegg or deMaizeire had more than their fare share in preparing and implementing this concept. 
Abenheim, Bundeswehr. 53–55 
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inception of Innere Fuehrung, its present and future challenges. Wiesendahl and his co-
authors help to understand how Baudissin was trying to get as much as possible of his 
philosophy into the Bundeswehr as well, as they point out that recently especially the 
history of Innere Fuehrung was in the focus of research.46 Additionally current  
challenges  towards  the concept  are  described.   
In the year of the fiftieth birthday of the Bundeswehr in 2005 Rolf 
Clement and Paul Elmar Joeris created an extensive compendium with accurate timelines 
and various documents.47 Above the mere listing of milestones, they describe the gradual 
evolution from an army with the main scope of defending the German territory during the 
Cold war towards an expeditionary force. Additionally they manage to reflect the trends 
in the German society towards the creation of the armed forces and its evolution. 
Amongst others, this description is used as a timeline in order to define the state of Innere 
Fuehrung today. The role of Innere Fuehrung gets a prominent part in their book while 
the reaction of the Bundeswehr towards the new challenges is also described in a way 
that proves to be useful for the Transformation part of this study.         
As for the Innere Fuehrung part, it is obvious that the English-language 
sources are neither very numerous nor very new. For example, Catherine Kelleher’s book 
chapter dates from 1982. Nevertheless, it still provides a concise and detailed overview 
concerning the period from the 1950s to the 1980s.48 
Similarly, Donald Abenheim’s 1988 Reforging the Iron Cross is an 
introduction in English on this subject that looks at the 1950s through the 1970s.49 In 
addition to the archival sources present at the time, Abenheim was able to interview the 
relevant persons for the introduction of Innere Fuehrung, including Count Baudissin and 
                                                 
46 Elmar Wiesendahl (ed). Innere Fuehrung fuer das 21. Jahrhundert—Die Bundeswehr und das Erbe 
Baudissins. Paderborn et. al.: Schoeningh 2007.17–19.    
47 Clement and Joeris, 50 Jahre Bundeswehr : 1955 bis 2005. 
48 Catherine Kelleher, “The Defense Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany,” in: The Defense 
Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, edited by Murray, Douglas J. and Viotti, Paul R., Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1982: 268–298. 
49 Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed 
Forces. Princeton: 1988. Wherever appropriate this study relies on the 1989 published and edited German 
version of this book: Abenheim, Donald. Bundeswehr und Tradition. 
 18
Count Kielmansegg. The latter, with whom that author was on cordial, professional 
terms, even writes the epilogue. Abenheim followed the work of others who had 
conducted extensive interviews with the founders of the Bundeswehr, adding the 
dimension of the personal and professional to the archival sources.  Although the volume 
concentrates on the role of a valid heritage for the Bundeswehr and hence the role of 
tradition for the Bundeswehr rather than mainly Innere Fuehrung, the very well 
researched and detailed book provides this study with the necessary depth.50 Therefore, 
the thoughts elaborated in Abenheim’s book are used to support basic discussions.  
Abenheim’s latest work, Soldier and Politics Transformed, offers a critical 
résumé of Innere Fuehrung in the face of Transformation in a comparative German 
American perspective.51 Challenges resulting from Transformation in the years since the 
early 1990s are depicted and compared with today’s Innere Fuehrung. In order to 
compare these challenges, Abenheim explains Transformation as well as he shows the 
often neglected perspective of the shortfalls of the Revolution in Military Affairs partly 
based on Clausewitzian thinking. His reflections are contrasted later on with the other 
sources for Transformation.  
Because Innere Fuehrung deals with such fundamental questions as power, 
obedience, values, education, knowledge, and conscience, the social sciences of  
sociology respectively psychology also contribute definitions necessary for an 
understanding. These definitions can also be used to understand a few key factors in 
Transformation as well as in the latest RMA with its emphasis on information superiority. 
These definitions mostly are derived from the theory called “social constructivism.” This 
particular theory emphasizes the importance of culture and its context. It creates an 
understanding of the phenomena within a society. The observations of these phenomena 
                                                 
50 In order to understand the difficulties of the Bundeswehr in the beginning to find traditions or to 
find a sound relationship to German soldiers and their soldierly values, the role of Innere Fuehrung is 
undoubtedly necessary in order to understand the justified fear of contact with the German past. Since 
Innere Fuehrung marks the successful attempt of “liberal and civilian powers to control military forces” the 
critical relationship between the searches for an acceptable tradition of elements of the past and Innere 
Fuehrung a tradition on its own is crucial. Ibid. (German Version) 214.  
51 Donald Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed: German-American Reflections on Civil-
Military Relations in a New Strategic Environment. Berlin: Miles, 2007. 
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“construct” the knowledge on which an individual’s understanding of his environment is 
based.52  Although not a new theory, this study utilizes a more recent version. 
Admittedly, this theory is often criticized as an elitist and too self-sufficient theory; it 
nevertheless allows an openness to other concepts that enables us to incorporate other 
approaches to a certain degree, as Kenneth R. Gergen puts it.53  
This approach is chosen because at various stages of this study it is useful 
to explain the seemingly changing role of power, coercion and group pressure in the 
Third Reich towards shaping the individual reality of soldiers and their decision making 
process. Gergen’s work is useful for this study in this particular subject since he contrasts 
the role of structural power with the role of post-structural power as theorized by Michel 
Foucault.54 In this contrast, structural power is a remnant of the past as expressed in the 
relationship between rulers and ruled. Those in power were clearly to identify as “kings, 
dictators, and warlords.”55 They had the means of power in the form of “material control, 
for example armies, weapons, property, or money.”56 Over time, the means changed into 
the shape of institutional control. This “institutional control rests on sets of beliefs—
shared ideas, values, and sentiments often called ideology.”57 Consequently Gergen 
introduces the term “hegemony” in connection with “ideology” as coined by other 
theorists since hegemony is “a capacity to gain and sustain control through the unification 
                                                 
52 David S. Wilson, “Evolutionary Social Constructivism,” 
http://evolution.binghamton.edu/dswilson/resources/publications_resources/DSW05.pdf accessed 
November 23, 2007. 
53 The biggest problem of social constructivism, however, is that despite its scientific beauty one 
could get the impression that people do not behave accordingly. They do behave exactly the way 
constructivism explains it because they react to their constructed reality with the same constructed means 
from this constructed reality. They could not have possibly acted any differently. These seeming shortfalls 
remind us that constructivism is a theory that explains (constructed) reality but not a recipe that helps to 
construct reality for all. Other factors what one would call irrationality have to be taken into account. 
Kenneth R. Gergen, An Invitation to Social Construction. Los Angeles et al.: SAGE Publications, 1999. 
206. 
54 Gergen, An Invitation, 206. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 204. 
57 Gergen in this case refers to the way structural power was seen at the turn of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Gergen, An Invitation, 17. 
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of multiple institutions (for example, government, education, military).”58 In fact, power 
seen in this way is a question about being free or being controlled.59 Over time based 
upon knowledge gained trough experiences as accumulated in history, such a relationship 
that used to had benefits for rulers (power) and ruled (protection) turned into a rather 
negative connotation.60   
For the later part, this approach can be used to explain, how the concept of 
Innere Fuehrung gradually became the reality for the Bundeswehr trying to make us of a 
mixture of structural and post-structural power. Gergen quotes Foucault when he sees the 
starting point for shifting away from hierarchical structures in the advent of the 
Enlightenment.61 As a consequence of the changing forms of structural power he 
furthermore refers to Laclau and Mouffe when he concludes that “the traditional idea of 
hegemony, as the unified and interdependent efforts of multiple institutions to form a 
monolithic whole, is no longer applicable in Western democratic societies.”62 Power 
appears in such democracies as a “multiplicity of nodal points.”63 It is exactly this 
multitude of such nodal points that makes it difficult to identify the respective importance 
of these single points in the overall network a society constitutes.64 In addition to this 
problem the sources that fuel such nodal points vary and are not fixed.65 Allowing the 
postmodern view of power as a developed addition to the structural approach fosters the 
understanding of the two main topic blocks of this study. The understanding of power, be 
                                                 
58  Gergen, An Invitation, 17. 
59 Ibid., Reduced to economic means, this duality becomes the classical Marxist taxation of “Haves” 
and “Have nots.”  
60 Ibid., 205–206. 
61 Ibid., 206. 
62 Ibid., 208. 
63 Ibid.  This point is valid for this study in both parts. It shows the challenges Innere Fuehrung as well 
as EBAO have to face. The idea of “nodal points” as coexisting and varying centers of power constituting a 
net of power becomes again useful in order to explain the systemic approach as assumed in EBAO. As one 
can see later on EBAO tries to influence certain nodes in order to change the net rather than bluntly 
destroying the net.  
64 A possible criticism to EBAO focuses on the complexity of such networks in other and hence rather 
unfamiliar societies. In turn this means also that one has to accept that other societies have a more structural 
i.e. rather traditional approach to power.  
65 Gergen, An Invitation, 207–209. 
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it the own or the one of a possible opponent is crucial in order to pursue one’s own goals.  
Additionally this approach is helpful in order to show the problem of the (non-) 
universality of knowledge and values as factors of a constructed reality of groups.66 
Because the role of values, norms and ethics are relevant for the construct 
of Innere Fuehrung as well as for the new challenges to the security environment, a closer 
look at the concept of relativism has to be taken. Relativism in this study shall be the 
position that is characterized by the denial of absolute or universal standards. Andrew 
Heywood differs between moral and cognitive relativism.67 For him “moral relativism 
rejects the notion that there are, or can be, authoritative ethical principles, usually because 
the individual is a morally autonomous being.”68  Additionally he states that “cognitive 
(…) relativism holds that different modes of knowing are equally valid and thus 
dismisses the universalist pretensions of science.”69  He further points out that the 
concept of relativism has been criticized “for weakening the moral cement of society” 
and that this concept is basically the opposite of fundamentalism.70 As for the chosen 
theory of social construction Gergen argues that “there is no position of relativism, that is, 
a transcendent standpoint from which we can rule on the relative merits of various 
contenders without espousing any values.”71 In this view, Innere Fuehrung is not a 
concept prone to relativism either. It does recognize the pluralism of German society but 
at the same time the legal and to a certain extent ethical framework as built upon the 
German Basic Law is the foundation of German society and hence of the Bundeswehr.72     
                                                 
66 Gergen, An Invitation, Gergen refers to it as “cultural imperialism.”  
67 Andrew Heywood, Politics, 2nd ed. Houndmills et al.: Palgrave Macmillan: 2002. 
68 Ibid., 412. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. For the purpose of this study, his definition of fundamentalism is adopted in the short version, 
whereas “fundamentalism is a style of thought, in which certain principles are recognized as essential 
truths that have unchallengeable and overriding authority regardless of their content.” Ibid., 63. Innere 
Fuehrung in this case is a kind of fundamentalism since the own conscience of a responsible soldier acts as 
the last resort, the overriding authority. 
71 Gergen, An Invitation, 231. 
72 ZDv 10/1. Chapter 3. 
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As the German Ministry of Defense White Paper of 2006 translates Innere 
Fuehrung as “leadership development and civic education,” it is evident that education 
plays an important role in this concept. This fact becomes even more interesting since the 
Bundeswehr does not have a common agreed definition of education itself. Education in 
this case is a sociological phenomenon on the aggregated level and a psychological 
phenomenon on the individual level. It is little comfort that neither sociology nor 
psychology offer a common agreed definition of education either.73 This might be a 
shortfall since education is a controversial topic in the Bundeswehr.74 Education in this 
connotation differs from training, plainly, as it must. 
Especially in connection with military forces, education often is viewed as 
propaganda that is supposed to act as a motivator. Because Innere Fuehrung is based on 
education or, for some might be the ultimate use of education, this study relies on the 
following simple understanding to differ between education and propaganda: 
“propaganda tells people what to think whereas education teaches people how to think.”75 
Because in general the question of obedience is a central element in any 
hierarchically organized institution as military forces are a few definitions are needed. As 
the experiences of the past had shown, blind obedience contributed a great deal to 
catastrophe. Therefore, the question of obedience, or to be more precise the tolerable 
degree of obedience, was (and still is) considered a central element for the future German 
military forces were Innere Fuehrung should form the code of behaviour respectively the 
code of conduct. For the purpose of the study, the definitions of Stanley Milgram given 
                                                 
73 Due the limitation in space, this study does not try to solve the problem of definition of education 
for adults. Although Gergen’s attempt to counter constructivism with Foucault’s post-modernism in order 
to fuse core elements is interesting. Gergen, An invitation, 40–41. For the role and importance of military 
pedagogy see Hartmann, Innere Fuehrung, 94. 
74 The discussion one can find also in a whole chapter at Hartmann. He also deals with the possible 
paradoxes as the rejection of education while appreciating at the same time the concept of Innere Fuehrung. 
Ibid., 85–104. 
75 The goal of education for Innere Fuehrung is the responsible soldier. Ibid., 95. The quote is cited 
from Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, 14. 
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for obedience shall act as foundation for the later discussion.76 For Milgram “obedience 
is as basic an element in the structure of social life.”77 Furthermore, he concludes that 
“some system of authority is a requirement of all communal living” and obedience is “the 
psychological mechanism that links individual action to political purpose.”78 In addition 
to that he recognizes that obedience “is the dispositional cement that binds man to 
systems of authority.”79 A contrast or maybe an obstacle for the realization of the 
principles of Innere Fuehrung is his view of obedience based on his experiments in a 
reference to the Holocaust and the then German society since he further points out “that 
for many people obedience may be a deeply ingrained behaviour tendency, indeed, a 
prepotent impulse overriding training in ethics, sympathy and moral conduct.”80 The 
question when exactly “moral judgments of the individual must override authority” he 
cannot answer either.81  Further research had shown that people are less willing to inflict 
pain and harm to other people as long as they consider them human. Even if the setup of 
his experiment seems questionable from today’s point of view and given the rather small 
likeliness that the results would be the very same, it is the aftermath of his experiment 
that is even more remarkable.82 As soon as some of the participants realized that they had 
traded their existing moral standards for the sake of an authority representing the success 
                                                 
76 As the famous Milgram experiment in the early 1960s named after the Yale university psychologist 
Stanley Milgram showed, people in general are prone to authorities and are willing to obey if they believe 
that obedience is necessary in order to pursue a goal they can identify themselves with. Despite often 
conveyed criticism this experiment is remarkable since it was conducted with people closely related to the 
time, i.e. people who were educated in an authoritarian style typical for the first half of the twentieth 
century. In this case it does not matter whether the study participants were selected and paid for their 
participation since they are “contemporary” participants in the meaning of contemporary witnesses. The 
description of the experiment can be found at 
http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~wwu/psychology/compliance.shtml accessed May 12, 2008. 
77 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. New York: Harper Perennial, 




81 Ibid., 2. 
82 The effect of learning helps to construct a new reality, i.e. knowledge about this experiment would 
hinder possible participants from doing it again. However, it is still likely that persons not knowing the 
implications of this experiment would act as did those participants of the first time. A summary of further 
criticism can be found at Werner Stangel, http://paedpsych.jk.uni-
linz.ac.at:4711/LEHRTEXTE/Milgram.html accessed May 12, 2008.  
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of the experiment they immediately knew that they should not have done so, i.e. the 
knowledge of “good” or “bad” obviously was suppressed by authority and the decision to 
obey: Obedience had become the new moral instance.83 Milgram tried to prove that 
obedience does not necessarily depend on a certain predisposition towards sadism or evil 
nor does it need a lot of coercion.84   
Another classic in the research of obedience is the book of Herbert 
Kelman and Lee Hamilton.85 Here it becomes clear that the relationship of obedience and 
authority is a relationship of give and take. The submission of free will under an authority 
often enough happens under the premises that there is an exchange in the shape of a 
reward for obedience. Kelman and Hamilton however, elaborate the question where and 
when disobedience is justified. They see the roots based upon religion: “Normative 
support for disobedience in the modern West is thus rooted in Judeo-Christian 
tradition.”86 Remarkably, they start out with an example where God, the ultimate 
authority, wanted Abraham to sacrifice his dear son, the ultimate form of obedience.87 
Despite a last minute waiver, a sign Abraham might have expected, he prepares to obey. 
The interpretation of this scene of Genesis might vary. What is interesting for this study 
is the fact of total submission to an authority based upon trust in this authority. In other 
words if an authority is able to create such a trust relationship obedience seems able to 
pass over own existing moral standards formerly given by this very authority.88  
As seen from the theories and the experiment there is an area of tension 
between obedience and authority. Innere Fuehrung tries to deal with this area of tension 
by referring to the legally guaranteed limits of the duty of obedience.89  
                                                 
83 Milgram, Obedience, 6. 
84 Ibid., 4. 
85 Herbert C. Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press,1988. 
86 Ibid., 58. 
87 Ibid., 59.    
88 Ibid. 
89 ZDv 10/1. No. 309. 
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Social constructivism is also the source where the description of the 
function of values is taken from for use in this study. Values are the source for 
legitimation, whereas “legitimation is the process of “explaining” and justifying.”90 
Furthermore, “legitimation produces new meanings that serve to integrate the meanings 
already attached to disparate institutional processes.”91 Values in this case are not the 
only source for legitimation, since it “has a cognitive as well as a normative element.”92 
Berger and Luckmann further argue that this process of legitimation “always implies 
“knowledge” as well.”93 Finally, they conclude that “there must first be “knowledge” of 
the roles that define both “right” and “wrong” actions within the structure.”94 In this 
study it becomes clear that such is the role of Innere Fuehrung; it incorporates values and 
it provides knowledge or encourages individuals to make use of their knowledge. 
b.  Transformation (EBAO, NCW) 
Transformation is often seen in connection with its technological 
manifestations. Such a combination surely is a result on the primary focus on technology 
fostered by technocrats and an eager defense industry that is willing to sell technology 
and hence also perpetuates the glossy image of a zero loss war. This image in turn suits 
those who are convinced that war is applicable in limited doses and inevitably limits the 
role of a soldier to that of a combat machine or part of combat machinery.95 Despite its 
close relation with the Revolution of Military Affairs and its fixation on capabilities, 
Transformation itself must be seen in a different, deeper context, “in its true strategic 
dimension.”96 
                                                 
90 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Anchor Books, 1966. Reprint 1989. 92–94.  
91 Ibid., 92. 
92 Ibid., 93. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., 93. 
95 Abenheim, Soldier, 171. 
96 Ibid., 225. 
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Whoever criticizes a simply reduction on technological aspects is right as 
long as the human dimension for example of EBAO is neglected.97 For the purpose of 
this study, however, the implications of Transformation on the human beings and the 
related impacts on the respective institutional cultures are in the focus.  A closer 
definition and the related contrasting of these terms as well as their interaction with such 
business cultures are conducted in chapter III. For the time being, the idea of EBAO 
regardless a deeper development or future shape shall be close to that of the 2006 paper 
from Smith: 
The strength—and challenge—of an effects-based approach to operations 
is that it squarely addresses this complexity by concentrating on the most 
complex aspects of this world: man, his institutions, and his actions. 
Indeed, the entire effects-based approach can be characterized by four 
things: a focus on the human dimension of competition and conflict; the 
consideration of a full spectrum of actions whether in peace, crisis, or 
hostilities; a multi-faceted “whole of nation” concept of power; and the 
recognition of the complex interconnected nature of the actors and actions 
involved.98 
The Transformation literature includes official sources from NATO, 
NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT), U.S. Joint Forces Command 
(USJFCOM), and the German Ministry of Defense (MoD). The concepts and documents 
retrieved from the websites of these organizations are considered primary sources as to 
official policy. Transformation, however, is seen differently on the two sides of the 
Atlantic. The United States takes a more technology-oriented approach, while Germany 
favors a conceptual approach, including an overarching security concept.  
                                                 
97 Edward A. Smith published in 2002 his often as “EBO-bible” regarded book which surely had a 
certain appeal to those who seek the solution primarily in technological answers. 
Edward A. Smith, “Effects Based Operation (EBO)—Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis 
and War,” CCRP Publication Series, Washington 2002. Given the wide reception based on the then surely 
fashionable topic a gradual development of thoughts had taken place. Four years later a sequel was 
published where the title already implied a development. Edward A. Smith, “Complexity, Networking, & 
Effects-Based Approaches to Operations, CCRP Publication Series, Washington 2006. 
98 Edward A. Smith, “Whither EBO? Prospects for a Network Enabled Synergy.” Command and 
Control Research Symposium. 2006. http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2006_CCRTS/html/papers/217.pdf 
accessed May 10, 2008. 
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Literature responding to these sources often conveys criticism and is often 
enough on the verge of a policy paper. Although Transformation is widely seen as an 
answer to the new security environment, the term itself has become pejorative for many 
soldiers.99 Thomas Hammes book acts as a typical example for this trend. He addresses 
this in his critical analysis of the process of Transformation that most NATO military 
forces are pressed into today.100 His conclusions though are mainly focused on a rather 
pragmatic lessons learned approach from the Iraq experience. However, he manages to 
characterize a few core elements of EBAO such as “Networking,” “information 
availability” or the information exchange with civilian experts.101 Given his reception he 
unfortunately does not connect these positive aspects seamlessly with Transformation or 
EBAO.  
Instead of fighting transformation, as most forces with traditional 
orientations are doing, it should be considered that “Transformation is not just about 
technology and things,” as the late Admiral Cebrowski put it; it is “rather, more about 
culture, behaviour and the creation and exploitation of promising concepts to provide 
new sources of military power.”102 Such of course might be a euphemism for the 
desperate attempt to overcome budgetary restrictions and trying to find answers on the 
question how modern military forces can face altered security challenges.103 
Using the rather tactical level of the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) of 
NATO as a start point Rainer Meyer zum Felde begins his examination of the question 
                                                 
99 The idea of an answer to the new security environment is derived from the German MOD (ed.): 
White Paper 2006.  
100 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. St. Paul, MN: Zenith 
Press, 2006. 
101 Ibid., 275. 
102 Cebrowski quoted in Smith, Complexity, Preface. 
103 Altered security challenges are also the motivation for an UK based definition for transformation 
(“realisation of how we have to change the way we operate (transform)”). Furthermore an Effects Based 
Approach is seen as follows: “These campaigns will also include Other Government Departments (OGDs) 
and Non-Government  Organisations (NGOs), amongst others, as key stakeholders in a campaign, all of 
whom will have key roles in delivering a successful outcome. While this is not new it is the 
acknowledgement of the capabilities that these players bring to the campaign, which has resulted in the 
generation of an Effects Based Approach … which addresses cross government planning synergies, and an 
Effects Based Operational Concept … , addressing the Military requirement to deliver their role in future 
campaigns.” www.dodccrp.org/events/10th_ICCRTS/CD/papers/106.pdf accessed May 10, 2008. 
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where NATO Transformation might lead to. He concludes that at the level of CIMIC 
within the process of Transformation in future operations only a coherent civil and 
military interagency might provide the necessary effects.104 Although this is not the main 
focus of this study it gives once more the outlook of the complexity “simultaneousness” 
of future engagement spaces as well as it shows that civil military interagency is one of 
the cornerstones of the new concepts.  
EBAO and NCW presently are widely discussed.105 For the depiction of 
the original Effects-Based Operations (EBO) principle and its relation to NCW, this study 
relies on the 2002 published book of Edward A. Smith.106 Milan Vego, for example, 
argues that EBO as the military core of EBAO tries to replace the art of war by an 
excessive use of technology.107 
At least four different “schools” of thought can be observed: the American 
(EBO),  the British (CA),108 the German, and the NATO ideas (EBAO). The latter two 
are similar in their multilateral approach with an emphasis on interagency cooperation, 
while the first focuses on the use of national instruments of power in one strong executive 
                                                 
104 Rainer Meyer zum Felde, “From NATO’s Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) towards 
Coherency of Civil and Military Interaction in Future Complex Engagements: A case Study in the Context 
of NATO’s Transformation.” in: Heiko Borchert, (ed.). Zu neuen Ufern: Politische Führungskunst in einer 
vernetzten Welt. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag 2006: 55–75. 
105  When referring to EBO or NCW; their origins or manifestations can be traced back to the very 
early 1990s where they where partially visible in the Gulf War. John Warden with his Five Rings Model, 
David A. Deptula with his further refinement or even the earlier John Boyd and his famous pilot oriented 
“OODA-loop” (observe, orient, decide, act) clearly mark this development as a genuine U.S. one.  A 
detailed illustration can be found at John Andreas Olsen, John Warden and the Renaissance of American 
Air Power. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2007.      
106 A short version of the meanwhile developed and adapted thoughts are offered at Smith, Edward 
A., http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2006_CCRTS/html/papers/217.pdf  accessed May 10, 2008. 
107 Milan N. Vego, Effects-Based Operations: A critique. 
108 CA with a strong element of the Maneuverist Approach.  Furthermore the differences are 
expressed as follows: “There is a view that Effects-Based Operations are wholly in the kinetic domain and 
associated with warfighting. The UK view is that the effects based approach should be based upon all three 
levers of power and should look to the long term in order that a co-ordinated plan can be made across the 
Diplomatic, Economic and Military domains to achieve an end state where stability is viewed as a high 
level of Governance, Rule of Law, Economic and Social Well Being, and Security in a region in instability.” 
Such were the thoughts as expressed by Julian Starkey of the UK Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre. 
www.dodccrp.org/events/10th_ICCRTS/CD/papers/106.pdf accessed May 10 2008. 
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hand and the second adds own thinkers and interpretations to the first one.109 However, it 
can be observed that the differences are slowly vanishing. 
Transformation, RMA, NCW and EBAO are not the same. They are 
related, though. Transformation is seen as the process to adept forces to the new, 
asymmetrical challenges of the security environment. RMA gave the technical impetus 
and the current RMA is the military expression of the information age. NCW is the 
modus operandi of some military forces of the twenty-first century, while EBAO might 
constitute the future link between strategy, planning, tactics and other domains of 
national as well as international power. 
C.  METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
1.   Methodology 
This thesis examines whether Innere Fuehrung remains valid as a guiding ideal of 
the Bundeswehr despite changes in technology and the emergence of new operational 
requirements. The latter include interagency cooperation with different organizations. 
Innere Fuehrung puts an emphasis on the soldier as a citizen and human being 
responsible for fulfilling his moral and legal obligations within his duties as a soldier. 
Therefore, this thesis discusses the historical background and current definitions of Innere 
Fuehrung. Political, historical, and social as well as cultural aspects must be also 
considered in order to understand the concept fully. Transformation-related aspects like 
EBAO and NCW are described and applied to past and ongoing operations. Connections 
with related concepts and ideas, including Auftragstaktik, and RMA are also examined. 
Due to the evolving quality and the dynamic character of these concepts, the assessment 
reflects trends and is not definitive.  
                                                 
109 Such an embrace of an overarching concept instead the mere reliance of small high quality forces 
seems at first hand rather surprising since British military thinking was and still is amongst others greatly 
influenced by the numerous writings of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Heart (1895–1970). J.P. Harris, Men, Ideas 
and Tanks: British military thought and Armoured Forces (1903–1939). Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1996.  The same accounts for other English speaking military thinkers. 
Abenheim, Soldier, 125. 
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2.   Sources 
The division of the literature into two major topic blocks shows how abundant the 
sources are. The thesis focuses on scholarly sources. However, various policy papers, 
doctrines, and basic documents of official origin are considered primary source literature. 
The majority of the literature consists of articles from peer-reviewed journals. Books on 
Innere Fuehrung are mostly written in German, while books concerning Transformation 
are rarely found due to the rapid speed of development and changes in this field. The 
internet sites of NATO Headquarters, USJFCOM and the German MoD contain a great 
deal of information. 
Data for Innere Fuehrung are derived from the annual report of the parliamentary 
commissioner of the armed forces.110 This is a valuable source, in order to determine 
trends in the climate and “state-of-the-art” of Innere Fuehrung in the Bundeswehr. These 
reports help to assess to a certain degree the effectiveness of Innere Fuehrung although 
they mainly act as an indicator for things gone wrong. In other words, these reports gain 
also their value for this study from the things not explicitly mentioned.  
In order to draw a closer picture or a at least picture based on data rather than 
deduction one wishes to find more data for example from ongoing or past operations or 
internal conducted surveys or social scientific studies. Such data are rare though or if they 
do exist, they are hardly accessible. The reasons are subject to speculation. For example it 
often can be observed that the publication of the result of such studies is delayed in case 
the result might reveal possibly uncomfortable insights in times of elections. If the 
publication is not delayed sometimes these studies are classified due to the military 
respective political nature. Such protective mechanisms might help to keep military 
secrets secret but they do hamper research that might lead to improvements. Admittedly, 
sadly enough available data from ongoing operations are simply not collected for the lack 
of money. This study is based on description and deduction. The need for the collection 
                                                 
110 Jahresbericht des Wehrbeauftragten. http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/16/008/1600850.pdf (accessed 
November 23, 2007).  Archived versions (2001–2006) can be found at 
http://www.bundestag.de/wehrbeauftragter/index.html.  
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of data is recognized and might help to underline or reject the hypotheses presented. 
Therefore to collection and evaluation of data is subject to further research.     
Because this thesis is classified “open,” the military documents examined are 
accessible via internet or from other sources are “open” documents. The German central 
field manual ZDv 10/1 is unclassified and therefore constitutes a very valuable source for 
this paper. Most of the scholars having researched the topic of Innere Fuehrung had to 
rely on its predecessors. Despite the rather moderate changes this study utilizes to 
contemporary version of the central field manual to a maximum possible extent as 
“existing reality” rather than referring to other scholars. 
Speaking of an “open” classification, the new central field manual is even 
available to the public as a colorful brochure: “ZDv 10/1 Innere Fuehrung: 
Selbstverstaendnis und Fuehrungskultur der Bundeswehr.”111 Distributing a military field 
manual in such a manner is the ultimate proof that Innere Fuehrung is an open invitation 
towards the German society to understand its military force and to remind this society to 
take part in shaping its forces through an open discussion. 
                                                 
111 In addition to the plain military edition entitled “ZDv 10/1 Innere Fuehrung” this brochure has the 
subtitle: “self image and culture of leadership.”  This document is downloadable at http://www.50-jahre-
bundeswehr.de/portal/PA_1_0_P3/PortalFiles/C1256EF4002AED30/W27C8L7X331INFODE/ZDv+10+1
+_Internet_72dpi.pdf?yw_repository=youatweb accessed May 16, 2008. 
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II.  INNERE FUEHRUNG 
Innere Führung gewährleistet, dass die Soldatinnen und Soldaten der 
Bundeswehr Teil der Gesellschaft sind und verpflichtet die Streitkräfte zur 
Wahrung von Recht und soldatischer Ordnung. Sie prägt die 
Führungskultur der Bundeswehr. 112 
 
Despite the above citation and its attempt at pithiness, the term Innere Fuehrung 
still defies a correct translation into English as well as a short definition. The White Paper 
2006 translates Innere Fuehrung as “leadership development and civic education” while 
later on refers to it as “guiding principle” and “concept.”113  
Others label this principle a “guiding philosophy” while the respective central 
field manual ZDv 10/1 describes Innere Fuehrung as a contributor to such a “guiding 
philosophy.”114 It surely would be possible to define Innere Fuehrung as the concept that 
allows the German citizen at arms to be a uniformed and convinced defender of the 
values and norms embodied in the German Basic Law and hence creating motivation as 
well as integration in society.115 Yet as Figure 1 illustrates, a few important factors 
contributing to this concept must not be omitted. 116 
This discussion is important because it can offer answers, if the main hypothesis 
that Innere Fuehrung is a universal concept should make any sense. This chapter 
therefore is more than a question of simple labels. For this reason Chapter II contains 
material dealing with historic origins, the relationship of history and tradition in relation 
to the Bundeswehr and Innere Fuehrung, and gives a short insight in the intellectual and 
cultural origins of this concept. Still, this chapter is not the place where one can find 
                                                 
112 “Innere Fuehrung guarantees that all soldiers [female and male] of the Bundeswehr are part of the 
society and obliges the armed forces to safeguard the rights and the soldierly order. It [Innere Fuehrung] 
coins the guiding philosophy of the Bundeswehr.” ZDv 10/1. Vorbemerkung. 3. 
113 White Paper 2006, 78–80. 
114 Pommerin, Exportartikel. 18–21; Hartmann, Innere Fuehrung.7; Central Field Manual ZDv 10/1. 
Vorbemerkung Nr. 3. 
115 Chapter 4, ZDv 10/1. 
116 The terms of this figure are translated from different chapters of the ZDv 10/1. “Basis and 
Principles” (Chapter 3) and “Domains” (Chapter 6). 
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handy definitions or a “lessons learned” approach despite the fact that the founding 
fathers of the Bundeswehr had a rich field to draw possible lessons from. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Innere Fuehrung—Basis, Principles and Domains 
 
For the purpose of this study one basic assumption must be made. When referring to the 
principle of Innere Fuehrung and the German Basic Law, it is referred to their ideal i.e. 
ideal condition in the abstract. Nevertheless, deviations from the norm and resistance or 
conflict with such principles are addressed wherever possible.  
To be sure, the reality of Innere Fuehrung comprises its aspirations in the ideal 
and the reality of same in military life. Such has been the case from the moment the 
founders of the Bundeswehr crafted these principles in the 1950s and today. There is no 
comparison of the mechanisms other democracies have made to integrate their military 
forces into society nor is there a comparison of the institutions of command, leadership, 
obedience and morale in NATO armies. Such an inquiry would triple the size of this 
study.  
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A.  HISTORIC ORIGINS—A QUESTION OF TRADITION OR MAYBE 
MORE?  
Die Bundeswehr ist die erste deutsche Armee, die in einen bestehenden 
freiheitlichen demokratischen Rechtsstaat hinein geschaffen wurde. Der 
demokratische Neuanfang nach 1945, der zur Gründung der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 führte, musste zwingend auch zu einem 
Neuanfang in den Streitkräften führen.117 
This section deals with the historic origins of the concept of Innere Fuehrung, its 
core elements and paves the way to the role of this concept today. Innere Fuehrung has 
become a trademark of the German armed forces since its inception in 1953 as well as a 
tradition itself in the life of the Bundeswehr. 
In order to understand the topic in its full range and its implications until today 
such a search however, is necessary. The same way it is necessary to discuss the role of 
what is called military tradition and its relationship with German and European history. 
What with the disaster associated with military power in Germany from the perspective 
of 1950, the prospects of a new foundation of the military profession in West Germany 
were pretty meager.  The danger of a restoration of a military caste as an anti-democratic 
force, as well as bogus revival of military honor at the expense of pluralism was a real 
threat in the early 1950s.  The founders of Innere Fuehrung had to fight such tendencies 
right from the beginning by extracting soldierly virtue from its abuse in National 
Socialism and in the era 1890–1933.118 At the same time, the Germans had to assure all 
their neighbors and future allies that Grossdeutschland had vanished.  
The exact historical origins of all the features of Innere Fuehrung defy easy 
generalization, because, in fact, its components have various origins and dates of birth 
reaching back to the 19th century. At the same time, the cult of tradition that had been an 
anti-democratic feature of the army and society has also origins in the mid-nineteenth 
                                                 
117 “The Bundeswehr is the first German Army that was created into an existing liberal democratic 
state founded on the rule of law. The democratic fresh start after 1945 that led to foundation of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1949 to led to a obligatory fresh start of military forces.” ZDv 10/1, no. 203. 
118 Amazingly enough it took the German MoD almost three decades to create a satisfactory 
document to give binding and durable guidelines on soldierly tradition. The result was the Traditionserlass 
from 1982. This discussion is continued in the next paragraphs. 
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century.  The debate about the efficacy of soldierly tradition inevitably was linked to the 
debate about the putting of Innere Fuehrung into practice.  
The key words “Weimar,” “Korea,” “Himmerod” and “Amt Blank” circumscribe 
the origins of Innere Fuehrung in the narrow sense of the years 1950–1955. The mere 
listing of so many valid topics gives a glimpse of the multitude of approaches where one 
could find the historic origins for Innere Fuehrung. Yet they would only describe a 
timeline leading to the introduction of this concept. Such a timeline could not describe 
the conflicted search for an identity, motivation and the necessary dissociation with the 
past century.  
1.  West German contribution to Atlantic Defense, 1948–1955  
The ZDv 10/1 contains a history of Innere Fuehrung in a brief chapter.119 Yet this 
very condensed version can function as an introduction. For the purpose of this study, a 
few additions have to be made to the above cited chapter in order to understand the time 
at the creation of Innere Fuehrung. The first part of this paragraph describes the 
international outline of the decade prior the foundation of the Bundeswehr while the 
second paragraph follows the line as drawn in the field manual.    
The outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 caused diffuse ideas from 1948–1949 
about a possible armament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to go into crisis of 
implementation in the summer and fall of that year.  By dint of the demilitarization 
requirements of the era 1944–1948, the new FRG in 1949 had no means to defend itself, 
such as it was, because the responsibility for this task rested with the western occupying 
powers.  The desultory reflection on this problem that had been manifest in certain 
unofficial memoranda in the period 1948–1949, however, became most acute when the 
NATO allies realized that the war in Korea might well duplicate itself in a divided 
Germany. In particular, the U.S. Defense Department (but not the U.S. State Department) 
wished to arm the FRG, a desire that conflicted with the statecraft of the French and with 
West German public opinion.  This desire for soldiers also echoed in the hearts of certain 
                                                 
119 ZDv 10/1. Chapter 2. 
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men around Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who sensed with vehemence the vulnerability 
of the new FRG to the East German and Soviet assault.  
Even though the United States and its allies faced war in Korea, Western Europe 
remained the strategic focus of U.S. policy. After World War II America did not 
withdraw all military forces from Europe. From 1947 America added its treasure to the 
reconstruction of Western Europe. Nevertheless, it needed a strong Western Europe to 
counter the Soviet threat, since the events of 1947/48. Almost two years after the end of 
WW II President Harry Truman expressed his doctrine, that the U.S. should actively aid 
all free governments in order to contain the Soviet threat in a weakened Europe.120  
This goal could only be achieved successfully together with a Europe where the 
West Germans were strong enough to contribute according to their potential. Two years 
from the end of WW II, the American image of the aggressive Germans, one should not 
fraternize with according to the “non-fraternization directive,” Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
1067, had dramatically changed at least in the ranks of the armed forces.121 American 
soldiers played a significant role in this change. The wartime enemy was dead, crippled 
or wounded but had left his hungry children and women in need of protection. A 
protection, gentleman—as most of the GIs were—could not refuse to give, especially to 
women.122 
Aside these personal encounters after years of coercion the “easy” American way 
of live appealed to West Germans, who quickly realized, that the American occupiers had 
much in common with the Germans or at least shared great interest for West Germans.123 
The Federal Republic of Germany had to be integrated into the western community of 
democratic nations.124 There had to be a twofold strategy taking care of economic needs 
                                                 
120 “Truman Doctrine” of 1947. http://www.trumanlibrary.org accessed May 9, 2008. 
121 Petra Goedde, “GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945–1949.” New 
Haven, Conn; London: Yale University Press, 2003. 204–205. 
122 “Cultural feminization became a powerful catalyst in America’s postwar rapprochement with 
Germany. The preponderance of women and children and the pervasiveness of hunger in early postwar 
Germany fostered American GIs a shift from one traditionally male gender role conqueror—to another—
protector and provider.” Ibid., 202. 
123 Ibid., 161. 
124 Ibid., 199. 
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and security incentives. Economic recovery should be established with the “European 
Recovery Program” better known as the Marshall Plan.125  
The introduction of the Deutsche Mark in 1948 along with the currency reform 
led to the Berlin crisis, which was overcome in a truly heroic effort by the famous 
“Berliner Luftbrücke” and the well-known “Rosinenbomber.”  West Germans and 
Americans were welded further together by this event. The Marshall Plan helped to 
stabilize West Germany and the other Western European economies and made American 
consumerism and pluralism part of the new Germany.126 
The other pillar European freedom should be built on was the security and 
defense integration. The Vandenberg-Resolution of 1948 finally enabled the U.S. to set 
the stage for the collective defense alliance.127 To keep “France in, the Russians out and 
the Germans down” the U.S. underlined their firm involvement in European affairs by 
signing the Washington Treaty in 1949.128 A presence of U.S. troops and European 
forces (NATO) as stationed defense forces versus an occupation army should be an 
institutionalized transatlantic link of a community of values and act as a bulwark against 
                                                 
125 “Cultural feminization became a powerful catalyst in America’s postwar rapprochement with 
Germany. The preponderance of women and children and the pervasiveness of hunger in early postwar 
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126 Ibid.,. 195–197. 
127 The Vandenberg Resolution: http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/appendices/3.htm accessed 
May 10 2008. 
128 Though no documentary proof substatiates the convention, this quote is commonly attributed to 
Lord Ismay, NATO’s first secretary general (1952–1957). It is cited from Michael Lind, The American 
Way of Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life. New York: Oxford University Press 
(USA), 2006.134.  
The signing of the treaty and the consequences are cited from John L. Harper, American Visions of Europe: 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
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 39
communism.129 This goal however was especially in the eyes of the Americans only 
possible with a substantial West German contribution.130 
The first half of this section outlined the international conditions leading to the 
wish for the armament of West Germany. The next section describes the political 
situation in West Germany in the decade after the war and it examines how the West 
German society dealt with the unwanted burden of soldiers.  
The term “total defeat” is an often used description for the situation in Germany 
after World War II. In ruins lay not only the urban centers, but the imponderables of a 
strong Prussian/German tradition of the soldier in the state. Germans had defined 
themselves and their xenophobic attitude as Kulturnation.131  Moreover, Germans had 
defined themselves via their military success ranging back to Franco-Prussian War from 
1870–1871. This war saw the proclamation of the German states to a union, the German  
 
                                                 
129 The description of the period is derived from Ryan C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at 
NATO: The Secretary General and the Military Action after the Cold War. Columbia, London: University 
of Missouri Press, 2006. 8–20. 
130 “The Korean incident not only changed the previously relaxed atmosphere of the NATO 
organization but also forced the German issue into a focus that many of the allies preferred to remain 
blurred. The change was inevitable. If the United States were to assume leadership in creating a viable 
military force in Europe with American troops and an American commander, it was only natural to expect 
United States pressure for utilizing German resources to the fullest.” Lawrence S.Kaplan, “NATO and 
Adenauer's Germany: Uneasy Partnership.” International Organization 15, no. 4 (Autumn 1961): 618–629. 
131 Kulturnation: The nation defines itself via common language, cultural heritage and common 
achievements for example in the field of science or military victories. Kulturnation and its counterpart, 
Verfassungsnation (nation based on the rather abstract construct of a constitution), are part of the concept 
of nationalism. From the view of political science it describes a concept with various shades. Without 
evaluation, it can be defined per se as a concept, where the term nation is the “central principle of 
organization” for a state. Nation in this case equals a construction, which is shaped “by a collection of 
cultural, political and psychological factors.”  Cultural factors are such as “common language, religion, 
history and traditions.” Cultural heterogeneity can be incorporated into such a construction. A 
psychological factor can be patriotism, defined as loyal affection towards this particular nation. 
Nationalism in general is closely related with the search for identity. During this identification process all 
groups try to find a few criteria that separate then from others, criteria that make them genuine. Most of the 
time, this process is therefore an excluding process at the expanse of the “other.” This is the point were the 
concept is prone to get involved with evaluation and the following characteristic: “(…) the habit of 
assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of 
millions of people can be confidently labeled ‘god’ or ‘bad’.” The definitions are taken from Heywood, 
Andrew. Politics. 2nd ed., London: Palgrave Foundations, 2002. 106 and 115. The closing citation can be 
found at Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West. New 
York: Vintage Books: 2005.10. A more historic approach towards this subject can be found at Schulze, 
Hagen. States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present. Malden, Mass. and Oxford 
(UK): Blackwell, 1998. 
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Empire. As a result, the German Empire was founded on the military victory resulting 
from the Prussian-German superiority and the humiliation of the Danish, Austrian and 
French opponents.132 
The rise of the stab-in-the-back” myth in 1918 provided the rationale for the lost 
war and the founding idea of National Socialism.  However, no such state of affairs 
existed, after World War II.133 This time soldiers could scarcely blame civilians for the 
real defeat.134 This war had left the battlefields, had resulted in millions of deaths and 
turned cities and hence the foundations of existence of a modern society into ruins and 
dust. Above that, the unconditional surrender not only shattered but literally wrecked 
former reference points of German identity. This time the Germans were not only 
militarily defeated beyond any doubt; they where even disarmed and sent for re-
education.135  
With this war and the mass murder of the Holocaust, the Germans had wiped out 
their reputation as a civilized Kulturnation within twelve years. Not only the defeat was 
complete and total, there were few remnants of a regime or government left to blame for 
since the Nazi state had ceased to exist in contrast to the situation of 1918.136 In other 
words the first group to receive blame were soldiers, even if many professions had been 
pillars of Nazism and many had tossed away their brown and grey uniforms to disappear 
for a few years.  The appearance of a Zero Hour may have been less reality than 
perception, but the discontinuity with 1918 was real and profound. This fact fostered the 
collective suppression of memories and allowed directing any energy and capacity left 
into a fresh start. In other words, the West Germans rolled up their tattered sleeves for the 
task of reconstruction, consumer spending and the enjoyment of jazz music. Coming into 
                                                 
132 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning and Recovery. 
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133 Ibid.,11–13. 
134 Ibid., 11. 
135 The fear of the “Morgenthau Plan” was still alive. For the Morgenthau plan and its chance for 
realization check: Harper, American Visions, 105–107. 
136 Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat, 10. 
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grips with the past was not a priority until many years later. The caesura of the Stunde 
Null made possible a new beginning in West Germany.137  
International factors also played an important role. They led to an attitude change 
toward the West Germans. The “struggle for power and position” in the cold war helped 
to overcome resentments.138 Before the end of the war and right after the war, the Allies 
were driven by the “Four Ds” policy on the Germans: Demilitarize, Denazify, 
Decartelize, and Democratize.139   
Besides such an attitude change caused by external factors, diverging views about 
the question of which design would suit West Germany finally led to a change of policy 
towards Germany. The occupying forces of Germany (the United States, Great Britain, 
France and the Soviet Union) soon started to disagree over the way the German state 
should be organized. In 1946/47 each of the allies favored an organizational principle 
similar to the principle their respective state was organized.140 In autumn 1947 at the 
London Conference, the difference over the diverging views of German statehood 
became irreconcilable. In 1947, the published communiqué of the Six Power conference 
of that same year made way for further alienation between the Allies.141 It gave this 
                                                 
137 “Stunde Null: Zero Hour.” Oscar W.Gabriel, Oskar Niedermayer, Richard Stoess (ed). 
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Heinz Laufer and Ursula Muench, Das foederative System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bonn: 
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inability to agree on the design of Germany finally to the creation of the “Trizone” and  
consequently to the foundation of the two Germanys.142  
With the help of rather foresighted than revengeful allies Western Germany 
started to take the path towards unquestionable West-Integration.143 It is the era that in 
Germany inevitably is connected with the name of Konrad Adenauer.144 This remarkable 
politician soon realized that West-integration would offer those benefits of security and 
sovereignty that later could lead to reunification. In other words he risked the unity of 
Germany for the price of security and limited sovereignty.145 
At the turn of the decade, the American attempts on the “issue of German 
rearmament” were openly pursued.146 Besides the strategic necessity to arm the FRG that 
would be a European battlefield in a hot war, the U.S. and UK saw the shifting of the 
defense burden to the FRG as a logical outcome of the Marshall Plan.147 In order to make 
use of West German economic power the French Premier Rene Pleven introduced in 
October 1950 the idea of a European army with German units well subordinated to 
operational and strategic control.148  
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When, in the second half of 1950, it became more and more obvious that the 
armament of the FRG would become a reality, Adenauer and his administration began 
first preparations.149 For these preparations the chancellor employed former high ranking 
officers of the Wehrmacht around Count Schwerin, men who were politically acceptable 
because of their ties to the anti Hitler Putsch of July 20, 1944.150  Due to the illegal 
nature of such work, a small group of less than twenty people met in early October 1950 
in a clandestine atmosphere in the isolated monastery of Himmerod in the Eifel.151 After 
much discussion, this group managed to produce a document that became the Magna 
Carta of the Bundeswehr the so called “Himmeroder Denkschrift.”152 It was the first 
major planning proposal for a West German contribution to Atlantic defense.  
In the middle of October 1950, Adenauer appointed his Christian-democratic 
party colleague and member of the German Parliament Theodor Blank as the 
Commissioner of the German Chancellor for issues of increasing of Allied troops.153 His 
eponymous office, the “Amt Blank,” later the nucleus of the German Ministry of 
Defense, was founded with a distinctly civilian character. Blank in turn relied also on 
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former generals of the Wehrmacht close to the British and the Americans as advisors, 
while Adenauer as Chancellor demonstratively continued to select reputable men for this 
office.154 In November 1950 the German Parliament agreed on the plan on the European 
Defense Community (EDC) introduced by Pleven and in May 1952 signed the foundation 
agreement for the EDC. Though the idea of a European army had been French, by August 
1954 strategic conditions had changed and the anti-American attitude of the opposition in 
the 4th Republic as well as the growing reliance on nuclear weapons led the French to 
ditch the idea, whereupon the U.S. and UK simply moved for the accession of the FRG 
into NATO directly.155 The Paris Treaties as of October 1954 lead to this NATO 
accession of the FRG in May 1955.156 On the bicentennial birthday of Scharnhorst, the 
Prussian reformer, the first soldiers of the newly founded German military force got their 
appointment.157   
The armed forces of the FRG arose from the growing antagonism between the 
Allies that became the cold war. The year 1949 saw the foundation of two German states 
in the Federal Republic of Germany and in October the German Democratic Republic. 
The Korea crisis in 1950 made the allies willing to arm the FRG. However, from the start 
in 1950, the possibility of a new army made many Germans angry. The price for the first 
steeps into sovereignty of West Germany was its armament and the unintended and 
undesired division of Germany.158 Neither the prospect of a supranational army as 
outlined in the European Defense Community (EDC) nor the integration of national 
forces into NATO helped to change the mind of those opposing West and East German 
soldiers only a decade after the unconditional surrender. 
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The “total defeat” resulted not only in the destruction of vast parts of Germany 
and its culture and economy, but also rendered illegitimate the antidemocratic mindset 
that obviously had been dominant throughout the preceding century. The union of east 
Elbian latifundia and Rhinish steel cartels had been broken; the mass murderers of the 
brown horde were either dead or in hiding, and hence, the political culture of West 
Germany had been radically altered.159 The young Federal Republic saw its future 
embedded in supranational structures. Militarism as defining factor for German 
nationalism fostered the rise of Hitler, the establishment of the Third Reich and finally 
led to the total defeat of Germany. Therefore any form of an army or military force then 
seemed unacceptable for the majority of the Germans.160 Such a perception was fostered 
in the early years after the war mostly by the Allies. National Socialism and the 
exaggerated—almost sacrosanct—position of soldiers in the German society equaled the 
German essence that had to be extirpated.161 The complete rejection of the past made for 
problems for the new German soldier since in reality such radical breaks with the 
continuity of institutions are never as straightforward as they might seem in the 
moment.162 Nevertheless, immediately after the war, the Germans wanted neither soldiers 
nor weapons and only sought a square meal and shelter or knowledge of the whereabouts 
of a missing father, son or brother.163 Such were the conditions the founding fathers of 
the Bundeswehr had to face. 
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2.   The Tradition of the German Soldier—a Constant Struggle? 
Germans are by nature subservient to authority, militaristic, and 
aggressive, and that there is very little that any one can do about this 
except deprive them of the means of making themselves dangerous to their 
neighbours.164  
One should distinguish clearly between the terms history and tradition.  Often 
those who invoke the past and speak of history actually intend to use tradition as a 
justification, explanation or a corner stone of their social and political ideas.  While 
history is the sum of events that has happened in the past, tradition is the more or less 
conscious choice of suitable events or habits to undergird a social and political role.  
Soldiers in particular often take a page from the Catholic Church and use the word 
tradition as a basis of their collective identity.165  In this connection, the founding fathers 
of the Bundeswehr could not simply revive the cult of tradition in the Prussian-German 
army has it had existed in the period 1880–1945 as the foundation of the professional 
ethos of the new West German army.   
After the total defeat in 1945 the vast majority of the Germans saw no need for a 
discussion of what constitutes soldierly tradition.166 Once a new army became a reality, 
the fathers of the future inner structure of the new Bundeswehr had to choose very 
carefully from the past as to legitimate aspects of training and education as practiced in 
the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht.167 The question became pressing and remained so.  
                                                 
164 This quote is taken out of context. Craig embedded this sentence in a denial of such 
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While the allies immediately after the war studied the methods of the Wehrmacht, the 
reality of the Wehrmacht in National Socialism made a revival of the latter a taboo.168 
While the fighting power and inner cohesion of small fighting units as the epitome of 
camaraderie had been noteworthy (with little attention paid to the draconian military 
justice) one could not separate this so called tradition from the ideological blindness of 
soldiers to the worst in national socialism.169 If the new soldiers had to be different from 
the generations having served in the Wehrmacht, the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr 
had no other choice than to reject the cult of tradition as it had existed heretofore. 
Discontinuity was the only choice.170  
This problem was later addressed in formal statements about military reform and 
soldierly tradition.  As the still-valid “traditions decree” (Traditionserlass) of 1982 
clearly states, “tradition is a fundamental base of human culture.”171 In the next sentence 
however, it also explicitly states that such a view “assumes as a prerequisite an 
understanding for historical, political and societal causal relationships.”172 This decree 
also defined tradition as “the handing down of values and norms.”173 Furthermore 
tradition results from a “process of a value oriented examination or analysis of the 
past.”174 It is this linking with values and norms that excludes any connection with the 
Wehrmacht or any other undemocratic German military force.  Since the Bundeswehr 
sees itself as the army of a German democracy, those exemplars of an undemocratic or 
antidemocratic past have no place. 
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The question of what counts as valid tradition for the Bundeswehr has been the 
subject of struggle since the 1950s.  The new central field manual ZDv 10/1 offers a 
prominent place in its preliminary remarks a clear statement.175 On the one hand it 
clearly refers to the German Basic Law as the appropriate and obligatory foundation of 
any evaluation of contemporary events.  The exclusive character of the second sentence, 
however, leaves a stronger impression. There is more though than the rejection of the 
Wehrmacht and another army not serving the German people rather than a party, its 
ruling class and socialism per se despite its name.176 
The search for an appropriate tradition led to a crystallization of three main lines 
as acceptable tradition for the Bundeswehr: the Prussian reformers and their ideas, the 
men of July 20, 1944, and the Bundeswehr itself.  The first one is commonly related with 
the idea of the citizen in uniform as the born defender of his or her country.177 The 
Prussian reformers began the emancipation of the subject into citizen with rights as well 
as duties.  The inability of the then Prussian Army to truly reform itself based upon the 
ideas expressed by Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Boyen is not part of  the accepted line of 
tradition.178  
The “memory beacon” of July 20, 1944,, truly is a celebrated line of tradition.179 
For Innere Fuehrung, this event formed a test of conscience, where the abuse of 
                                                 
175 “The German Basic Law and the critical dealing with the past oblige the Bundeswehr to evaluate 
political events and its connections within the present and to develop a sound understanding of tradition. 
The former German Wehrmacht as a tool of the national socialistic worldviews can not serve as a 
traditional foundation of the Bundeswehr. This extends to former National People’s Army [NVA, the army 
of the former socialist German Democratic Republic GDR] as the army of the party and the classes of the 
SED-regime [Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands; the ruling party of the GDR].”  ZDv 10/1. 
Vorbemerkung Nr.5. 
176 The oath to the GDR flag from 1962 onward, where GDR soldiers pledged allegiance to the 
ideology of socialism, can be found at Clement and Joeris, 50 Jahre Bundeswehr, 78. 
177 The idea in this fashion is commonly attributed to Scharnhorst and used to underline the necessity 
of a conscript force. Scharnhorst surely took his inspiration from the French Revolution and its aftermath. 
Foerster, Roland G. (ed.). Die Wehrpflicht: Entstehung, Erscheinungsformen und politisch-militaerische 
Wirkung. Schriftenreihe des militaergeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes. Muenchen: Oldenbourg, 1994. vii.  
178 Craig, The Politics, xiv–xv. 
179 The term “memory beacon” is taken from an article of Douglas Pfeiffer in the Journal of Military 
History. It is true that especially in the very early days of the German rearmament such memory beacon 
initially helped to separate between “good” and “bad” in reference to the Wehrmacht and hence was 
utilized.   
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obedience made these officers risk the lives of their families and their own to restore 
Germany’s place among civilized nations. Innere Fuehrung does not call for the 
assassination of the head of state, but it does encourage the role of conscience as measure 
for own actions and it protects those doing so from arbitrariness.180 Admittedly the plan 
to assassinate the leading figure is extreme but it was the realization of the incorrectness 
and the decision to take actions that are very important features of this date. In this case 
any criticism in the shape of “why took it so long” or “these soldiers did break their oath” 
does not matter at all. With the advantage of hindsight it is always easier to judge events 
of the past. Nonetheless, the choice of German officers to kill the head of state in the 
extremity of wartime embodies a remarkable event that highlights the limits of soldierly 
conscience and command and obedience.  How this historical event can form a soldierly 
tradition itself has been a source of controversy, but the men and women of July 20, 
1944, naturally serve as a source of tradition in a way that the celebrated Knight’s Cross 
Holders and darlings of the Nazi regime could and should not.  Therefore this date and its 
connotation is more than a fashionable and constructed reality.181   
The elements that constitute the tradition of the Bundeswehr help to understand 
the focus of the Bundeswehr on alliance defense. The Traditionserlass points out the 
importance of three elements for the formation of its own tradition: the first conscript 
military force in a democratic German nation, designed exclusively for defense, and 
integrated in an alliance of nation states devoted to the right of personal freedom and the 
rule of law. Such is the foundation of tradition of the Bundeswehr that contributes to its 
self image.182 
                                                 
180 ZDv 10/1. Annex 2/2. No. 4c. 
181 It is the same way true that the event of July 20,1944, was not the only sign of resistance as it is 
true that the Wehrmacht was not a completely innocent organisation composed of soldiers unwilling to 
follow their orders. There were other manifestations, too that also led to harsh consequences up to the 
execution of those soldiers resisting on another level. For the role of the Wehrmacht Omer Bartov offers 
interesting insights as well as the more recent work of Juergen Foerster. Omer Bartov, “Soldiers, Nazis, and 
War in the Third Reich.” The Journal of Modern History 63, no. 1 (Mar. 1991): 44–60. Foerster, Juergen. 
Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Eine strukturgeschichtliche Analyse. Beitraege zur Militaergeschichte. 
Muenchen: Oldenbourg, 2007.  
Kitterman finds a number of examples where soldiers of the Wehrmacht refused to take part in executions 
for a variety of reasons and were not executed. His findings are interesting, but his statistical evidence 
however, might be criticised for a small and selective “n.” Kitterman, Those who said ‘No!’ 252–253. 
182 Traditionserlass, no. 9. 
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The search for tradition for the Bundeswehr has been a struggle because of the 
Wehrmacht. In a nation with a strong sense of historical pride, such an effort has 
naturally been conflicted. The problem of the functional separation of possible qualities 
from the ill-fated motives however, has required long reflection and debate.183 Such a 
struggle is an inevitable consequence of defeat and the need to re-formulate the basis of 
military service in a new political context as well as an altered social setting. 
B.   DESCRIPTION  
1.  Attempts at Definitions 
Most of the scholars of Innere Fuehrung took their definitions or description from 
the 1972 and 1993 editions of the central field manual 10/1. This section explains and 
models gradually the constituent parts in order to foster an understanding of the overall 
construct as depicted in figure 1. The description of the main parts is supported by further 
figures. The gradual proceeding by description shall compensate the lack of definitions 
this paragraph only partially can offer. 
As Figure 2 shows, Innere Fuehrung identifies four goals and recognizes one 
central element: 
 
                                                 
183 Knab, Jakob. “Zeitlose soldatische Tugenden.” ZEIT ONLINE 46/2005. 92. 
http://www.zeit.de/2005/46/A−Bundeswehr  accessed May 11, 2008. 
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Figure 2.   Four Goals and the Central Element of Innere Fuehrung  
Based on one central element, Innere Fuehrung seeks to create legitimacy and 
guarantee the democratic integration of armed forces. Furthermore the design of the inner 
order or the institutional culture shall contribute to the proper motivation of the 
Bundeswehr.184 
Innere Fuehrung has a central element that acts as guiding motive, the citizen in 
uniform that is something distinct in the German experience than the dynastic soldierly 
caste, the national socialist soldier in race war or the soldier of the socialist unity part of 
the Soviet block. 
If one looks at the basic ideal of the concept of Innere Fuehrung , the citizen in 
uniform easily can be identified already partially in the ideas of Kant, more definitely in 
the French Revolution and its elevation of the citoyen. Further, the roots lie in the 
Prussian reforms as a response to the defeat Prussia suffered from Napoleon in 1806.  
                                                 
184 ZDv 10/1. No 401. 
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Even the ancient Greeks in Athens or to a lesser degree in Sparta at the height of 
the Persian wars in the fifth century BCE offer prototypes as well. With their reliance on 
self financed heavily armed hoplites (rich citizens) or lesser armed peltasts (not so well 
endowed citizens) they understood the importance and value of soldiers fighting for their 
own cause which however more often had very worldly motives, i.e. money and 
economic influence or control.185  
Innere Fuehrung however differs from all the previous roots because of the central 
fact: Service in order to defend the values incorporated in the German Basic Law, the 
“freiheitlich demokratische Grundordnung”(FdGo).186 It is this rather abstract and 
fundamental principle a soldier must defend. At the same time this hallmark of the 
“wehrhafte” democracy includes the forfeiture of basic rights in case any possible 
opponent deliberately tries to attack this system of values.187 This in turn leads to the 
right of resistance for all Germans in case they do not see any other possibility to protect 
this liberal democratic basic order.188 Among other things, this article 20 paragraph 4 of 
the German Basic Law creates the delicate balance between obedience and resistance. 
The ZDv 10/1 identifies three main domains for military leaders or superiors in 
general to lead, to educate, and to train: leadership, (military) law, and political 
education. 
 
                                                 
185 John Warry, Warfare in the Classical World. Norman (Okla.): University of Oklahoma Press, 
1995.25. 
186 A close literal translation for the “freiheitlich demokratische Grundordnung” leads to Liberal 
Democratic Basic Order. This abstract principle as mentioned in art. 18 and 21 (2) of the German Basic 
Law and is defined in the Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheid (BVerfGE 2, 1–12). It explicitly rules out 
any terror regime or despotic rule and emphasizes the self determination of the German people based on the 
rule of the majority as long as this majority respects the freedom and equality as guaranteed by the German 
Basic Law. Ernst Benda, in:  http://www.bpb.de/wissen/07403964499523816036687609136772.html 
accessed May 4, 2008. 
187 The term to be translated is wehrhafte Demokratie or streitbare Demokratie where wehrhaft or 
streitbar can be translated as “combative” or “valiant.” 
188 The text of the German Basic Law is derived from the following source: 
http://www.bundestag.de/parlament/funktion/gesetze/grundgesetz/gg accessed May 4, 2008. 
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Figure 3.   The Three Main Domains 
The preferred means to achieve the goals as described before are Auftragstaktik 
(mission command, directive control) and the mature and responsible personality of the 
respective military leader.189 The maturity in turn is expressed by the incorporation of 
Innere Fuehrung. Politische Bildung (political education) is not propaganda because 
political education truly is supposed to encourage the ability of the soldiers of the 
Bundeswehr “how to think.” Therefore political education teaches or offers tools rather 
than solutions in a sense of “what to think.” The motivation behind such an education is 
to create and foster an understanding of the mission as well as of the purpose and the  
 
                                                 
189 Auftragstaktik can be described as a process where a superior outlines the mission in a way that the 
subordinate has a high degree of freedom in the choice of means in order to fulfil the mission. In other 
words, the result is all that matters. This in turn requires well trained and educated superiors as well as 
subordinates and mutual trust. Despite the fact that Auftragstaktik and its German origin are widely known 
to an English-speaking audience, it is often neglected, that the term itself almost constitutes an oxymoron 
or at least the connection of a task (Auftrag) with tactics (Taktik) is too narrow. Auftragstaktik is rather a 
method than plain tactics. An interesting discussion of this topic with appropriate definitions can be found 
at: http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/heer accessed May 28, 2008. 
Although almost a decade ago Keithly and Ferris published an article with still interesting insights about 
Auftragstaktik and the discussion about this “command philosophy” in the twenty-first–century U.S. 
military force. David M. Keithly and Stephen P Ferris, “Auftragstaktik, or Directive Control in Joint and 
Combined Operations.” Parameters, Autumn 1999.   
www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/philosophy/source_materials/auftragstaktik-keithly_and_ferris.doc accessed 
May 27, 2008. 
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necessity behind the mission. For example, in order to keep the above described balance 
amongst others permanent training and education for example in the shape of political 
education is required.190  
 
 
Figure 4.   Political Education: Motivation and Goals 
 
Political Education is not a one-way street because all soldiers are obliged to 
inform themselves politically.191 The informed citizen in uniform cannot be separated 
from his or her background. Furthermore all soldiers are supposed to bring their political 
knowledge into daily service instead of leaving it outside the barrack’s gate. Political 
education therefore does not start from zero. It encourages the active formation of 
political objectives and explains political causal relationships. The four goals and the 
central element of Innere Fuehrung as outlined before are supported by the proper dealing 
with different views. In the process of political education historical knowledge shall 
support the consciousness of the values as embedded in the German Basic Law (figure 4). 
                                                 
190 Clement and Joeris, 50 Jahre Bundeswehr, 89. The conduct of political education is regulated in a 
different central field manual: ZDv 12/1, “Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr.” 
191 Ibid., no. 627. 
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These values are further anchored and their worthy of protection is acknowledged. By 
knowing own values and accepting plurality the intercultural competency and thus the 
respect for other cultures is strengthened.192  
Despite the aim to strengthen the own ability to judge political life and therefore 
foster discussion, the limits are clear though. The norms and values embedded in the 
German Basic Law remain the admittedly very liberal foundation.193 The ZDv 10/1 states 
the role of political education as the task of superiors or military leaders.194 Usually the 
lowest level of an officer responsible for this task is the company commander level. 
Innere Fuehrung realizes the norms and values embedded in the German Basic Law.195 
As a result a maximum amount of military effectiveness is achieved while at the same 
time it guarantees the maximum amount of liberties and rights.196 
 
 
Figure 5.   Ethical Foundations of Innere Fuehrung 
                                                 
192 Clement and Joeris, 50 Jahre Bundeswehr, 89. The conduct of political education is regulated in a 
different central field manual: ZDv 12/1, “Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr.” no. 620. 
193 Ibid., no. 626. 
194 Ibid., no. 602. 
195 Ibid., no. 301. 
196 Ibid., no. 302. 
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The principles of Innere Fuehrung are founded on ethical, legal, political, and 
social foundations. Additionally these principles correlate with military requirements.197 
The ethical foundations are seen in connection with the German Basic Law. The central 
field manual explicitly states that this document has been the most liberal constitution 
German ever had.198 Its system of values is based on the century long development of 
politics, philosophy and ethics in Europe. A special emphasis is put on the historical 
experiences. Hence this system of values is supposed to be a guarantee for the terms as 
depicted in Figure 5.  Directly after the ethical foundations, the central field manual 10/1 
refers to the duty of the state to honor and protect human dignity. Since it is a duty of the 
state as a logical consequence it is a duty of the Bundeswehr. The high value of human 
dignity and its protection form the ethical foundation and limit of daily service.199  
The legal or judicial foundations are composed of International Law, the German 
Basic Law, and such further laws as the military laws. This combination builds the legal 
framework, outlines the position of the Bundeswehr in the state and the position of its 
soldiers as well as it is the legally binding measure for their actions.200 Since the soldiers 
are citizens in uniform, their constitutional rights are curtailed to a minimum of military 
necessity. Finally each soldier is guaranteed an extra protection by the limitations of 
command of superiors. The duty to obey and its limitations are also regulated. 
Furthermore it is explicitly stated that no soldier is supposed to suffer any disadvantages 
or other arbitrariness while exercising his or her guaranteed rights.201 
The description of the political foundations starts with the “primacy of policy”:202 
The legitimate and legal will of German politics as expressed for examples in the 
decision of the German Parliament or other organs as stated by the German Basic Law 
have priority. This civil control commonly is regarded the strongest part of the civil-
                                                 
197 Clement and Joeris, 50 Jahre Bundeswehr, 89. The conduct of political education is regulated in a 
different central field manual: ZDv 12/1, “Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr.” no. 303. 
198 Ibid., no. 304. 
199 Ibid., no. 305. 
200 Ibid., no. 306. 
201 Ibid., no. 309. 
202 Ibid., no. 310. 
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military relationship. It means that the armed forces and planning of operations are 
subjects to civil control, i.e. the German Parliament.203 Further political foundations are 
expressed by the interests of German security policy as written down for example in the 
German Whitepaper 2006.204 Possible connection points to Chapter III can be derived 
from the statement that the mission of the Bundeswehr is integrated in the overall concept 
for security provision of Germany.205 
The social foundations are the liberal and pluralistic society of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Such a multi-facetted society is defined by a variety of 
convictions, individual plans for life, a variety of religious, ideologies, philosophies, 
views and interests. These differences are subject to change and partially competing with 
each other.206 The soldiers of the Bundeswehr are members of this society and hence the 
diverging—and from time to time conflicting—interests as described above are part of 
the Bundeswehr throughout the different generations, cultures and origins of its 
members.207 Innere Fuehrung enables the soldiers of the Bundeswehr peacefully to 
coexist with all their differences. Since German soldiers for example have the right to 
vote and the right to be elected and hence are requested to take an active part in political 
life, further guidance on how to behave in election times is not necessary.208 An open 
dialogue based on mutual trust creates the necessary camaraderie.209 Conscription is 
considered as an expression for the responsibility the German citizens have for their state 
and society.210 The principles of Innere Fuehrung are shown in Figure 6: 
                                                 
203 Ortwin Buchbender, et al. (ed.). Wörterbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik mit Stichworten zur 
Bundeswehr. 4th revised ed. Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn: Mittler 2000. 290. 
204 White Paper 2006. 10. 
205 The statement can be found in the ZDv 10/1, no. 311, while the White Paper 2006 refers to the 
task and the civil-military cooperation on page 72. 
206 ZDv 10/1. No. 312. 
207 The ZDv 10/1 recognizes partially the possibility of changing societies. The limits of the 
incorporation of such changes however, are the “freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung” and the 
improper limitation of the military mission. Ibid., no. 314.   
208 A strong contrast to this view one can find at Thom Shanker, “Military Chief Warns Troops About 
Politics” http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/26/us/politics/26military.html accessed May 26, 2008. 
209 ZDv 10/1, no. 313. 
210 Ibid., no. 315. 
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Figure 6.   Principles of Innere Fuehrung 
These principles are based on the before described foundations and are expressed in the 
criteria as outlined.211 
The role of military leaders is crucial to the concept of Innere Fuehrung and its 
reception. Superiors are supposed to act as a role model. Their influence on the spirit of 
their soldiers and their daily work is immense. Superiors educate by being a role model 
and they train their personnel with passion. They have to be credible at all times.212  In 
order to lead, train and educate their soldiers superiors have three main domains: 
leadership/ management of personnel, political education, and law respectively the 
military code of conduct. By making use of theses main domains, superiors coin their 
soldiers imminently and leave a lasting impression.213 
Leadership or management of personnel is an attempt to translate 
“Menschenfuehrung.” The following paragraph describes this main domain. The German 
                                                 
211 Clement and Joeris, 50 Jahre Bundeswehr, 89. The conduct of political education is regulated in a 
different central field manual: ZDv 12/1, “Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr.” no. 315. 
212 Ibid., no. 601. 
213 Ibid., no. 602. 
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Basic Law demands the unrestricted respect of human dignity, human rights including the 
principles of equality, justice, responsibility and tolerance. Hence these principles form 
the foundation for superiors to guide their soldiers. Leadership or management of 
personnel in this case are a core competence of all superiors in the Bundeswehr. The 
mastering of this core competence in turn is the foundation of appreciation and success as 
a superior. A positive attitude towards human beings is a conditio sine qua non for this 
main domain.214 
The next mentioned foundation in this domain is trust. It is the most important 
foundation for camaraderie and hence an indicator for successful leadership. Especially in 
situations of stress trust and camaraderie are linking elements through all ranks. Trust in 
turn demands good judgment of character and social empathy. Superiors therefore must 
get to know their soldiers. Additionally this requires an openness and willingness to get 
into touch with entrusted human beings.215 In dependence of the size of the unit allotted 
superiors are supposed to get to know all soldiers personally despite the time consuming 
procedure.216  
In order to create trust in their personalities superiors share the burden, 
deprivations and dangers together with their soldiers. The true quality of leadership 
shines through especially in such stressful situations where responsibility and the ability 
to lead have to be proven. Superiors must show a great deal of self-control and 
predictability. Innere Fuehrung in the daily routine becomes evident through a respectful 
dealing with each other.217 
Soldiers Bundeswehr must deal with the possibility of getting killed in action or 
getting severely wounded.218 Therefore superiors have to deal in an appropriate way with 
topics concerning the possibility of getting wounded or being killed. Questions related 
                                                 
214 Clement and Joeris, 50 Jahre Bundeswehr, 89. The conduct of political education is regulated in a 
different central field manual: ZDv 12/1, “Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr.” no. 604.  
215 Ibid., no. 605. Additionally no. 607: “Whoever wants to lead people must be philanthropic.”  
216 Ibid., no. 608. 
217 Ibid., no. 606. 
218 The discussion about soldiers and “sui generis” view can be found at Hartmann, Innere Fuehrung, 
139-140. 
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with the fear of being killed, having to kill, or questions of guilt and  
failure must not be oppressed or ridiculed.219     
2.  Theory versus Reality?  
Despite the mainly positive reflections on the concept of Innere Fuehrung up to 
this point, this study is not intended to be a simple advertisement for the merits and glory 
of Innere Fuehrung. Neither is it an attempt to convince the reader of the flawlessness of 
such a concept. Critics might point out that the legal foundation of Innere Fuehrung exists 
only in the shape of the respective central field manual. In other words, there exists no 
other explicit legal anchoring of Innere Fuehrung as one would expect for example in the 
German Basic Law.220 Furthermore these critics might relate to difficulties and the partly 
strong rejection of Innere Fuehrung in its early years and the related scandals. Over the 
years of the existence of the Bundeswehr there were a number of scandals where the 
promise of Innere Fuehrung collided with the reality of the Bundeswehr in daily life and 
even worse this promise was broken to individual soldiers. 
Daily frictions of reality however remind us that up to this point it was a 
description of the concept as outlined in its central field manual. The annual report of the 
parliamentary commissioner of the armed forces constitutes a valuable source for the 
lesser publicly known frictions and sometimes willful committed injustices resulting from 
unacceptable hardships in the daily routine.221 This report however, is more than a mere 
listing of sensations as some tend to read the given examples. Some of the prominently 
described events most commonly provoke a “how could they.” The ability to see these 
bad examples in this very sense partially is credited to the existence of Innere Fuehrung.   
                                                 
219 ZDv 10/1, no. 105 and 609. 
220 For this discussion close insights can be gained from Froehling, Innere Fuehrung. 45–46.   
221 The creation of this parliamentary commissioner is based on the Scandinavian example. The 
history of the circumstances leading to this creation can be found at Abenheim, Bundeswehr, Chapter 2.  
According Art 45 of the German Basic Law the German Parliament elects the parliamentary commissioner 
(Wehrbeauftragte) as an organ to protect the basic rights of the soldiers in the Bundeswehr. This is 
guaranteed by the right for any soldier to contact this parliamentary commissioner without being obliged to 
stick to the line of command. The parliamentary commissioner publishes an annual report concerning 
amongst others matters of Innere Fuehrung.     
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As already mentioned in the introduction almost every decade saw a scandal 
connected with leadership and morale as well as the liberal ethos of the West German or 
German soldier.  In 1963 in Nagold, an obvious misconception of training methods (i.e. 
an emulation of French or U.S. paratroopers’ methods) led to the death of one soldier.222 
This scandal and the connected methods connected the name of this town indelibly with 
the image of an extreme form of martinet.223  
In the 1990s, the first decade with the gradual move towards an expeditionary 
force in combination with new technological possibilities seemed to have created a 
suitable environment for a number of topically related scandals.224 It is this mixture of 
reasons that constitute the background for example for the “Hammelburger Gewaltvideo” 
dated from 1997.225 Seven misguided soldiers who where part of a unit responsible for 
the training of other troops going to Bosnia played during their lunch break scenes 
containing the more or less clear depiction of mindless violent scenes and taped them. 
Since nobody was really harmed and nobody ordered these individuals to exercise such 
scenes one could consider this in an act of benevolence as an immature and more than 
tasteless prank. Given the media coverage however, it turned into a nasty trick for some. 
What was really bad is the fact that it should not have happened since the depicted scenes 
are definitely the opposite the way Innere Fuehrung and hence society expect its soldiers 
to act—not even in a staged video.226  
                                                 
222 Abenheim, Bundeswehr. 144. 
223 The German expression Schleifer finds its slangy expression in the grinder, who is a drill sergeant 
tyrant. The literal translation “grinder” is related to the process of grinding down subordinates e.g. in basic 
training. Such actions were forbidden then (as they are still now). Innere Fuehrung or, to be more precise, 
the obvious absence of it led to its first crisis.    
224 A comparison and a rather complete listing including a commentary can be found at Matthias 
Geis, “Nach dem Video−Skandal: Ist die Bundeswehr ihrer neuen Aufgabe gewachsen, bei der 
Friedenssicherung auf dem Balkan zu helfen?.” Zeit online. 29. 1997. 
http://www.zeit.de/1997/29/video.txt.19970711.xml accessed April 28, 2008. An additional overview 
offers: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,444655,00.html accessed April 23, 2008.  
225 Hammelburg is a village in the far Northwest corner of Bavaria and home of the German Infantry 
School where the vast majority of training for the operations abroad is conducted.  
226 The consequence are usually the same: the concept of Innere Fuehrung is accused of having failed, 
the MoD has to figure out under the immense media pressure what actually has happened and while doing 
so the rules for training are under supervision. Usually it turns out that the initially given explanation of the 
MoD of the “singular cases” or “singular culprit” can be proofed and the public interest fades. The 
underlying societal consequences, however, are not of a great interest anymore. 
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A major scandal happened in 2004 in Coesfeld where again some instructors 
could not differ between their ill view of training including applied torture, the values as 
outlined in Innere Fuehrung and the resulting limitations for training.227 This time 
however, the number of culprits was as well larger as the scale, and it involved 
superiors.228 It was more than a tastelessness action discrediting the Bundeswehr. This 
time it involved breaking criminal laws. In a completely unacceptable way the 
responsible training staff had according to their views attempted to offer their recruits a 
more realistic training experience including a hostage situation with torture.229 At least 
one of the four (!) exercises was approved by the company commander. Even if not being 
involved personally he consequently was sentenced from the civilian court to a fine of 
7500 Euro.230 Other results of this verdict were five times probation from ten month up 
to twenty two month and four acquittals.231 
In spring 2003 a few German soldiers in Afghanistan posed in a more than 
disgusting way with human skulls they discovered at lime field where parts of human 
skeletons where easy accessible.232 When these photos gradually first surfaced in a high-
circulation German tabloid in 2006 the details where not known and the first impression 
was that the Bundeswehr repeatedly had desecrated graves. The public outcry and the 
                                                 
227  The chronology of the scandal until March 2006 can be found at: 
http://www.wdr.de/themen/panorama/8/soldaten_misshandelt/inhalt.jhtml accessed May 11, 2008. 
The more recent chronology can be derived from 
http://www.wdr.de/themen/panorama/8/soldaten_misshandelt/uebersicht.jhtml?rubrikenstyle=panorama  
accessed May 11, 2008. Additional information is derived from: Bittner, Jochen and von Randow, Gero. 
“Sadisten in Uniform.” ZEIT ONLINE 50/2004. http://www.zeit.de/2004/50/Coesfeld accessed May, 11 
2008. Despite a polemical inclination, this article especially deals with quality of the NCOs involved in the 
scandal. 
228 The investigations of the public prosecutor’s office include up to twenty seven suspects. The 
highest accused rank was the company commander, a captain followed by two master staff sergeants 
(Hauptfeldwebel). The verdicts of the trial are as of March 12, 2008.  
229 Such might be acceptable in the views of some for Special Forces under close observation of 
existing rules and being accompanied with the necessary psychologists since other armies involved in 
special operations are doing alike. For conscripts this is unacceptable. Hence, according to the critics,  a 
conscript army is useless in modern days. 
230 http://www.wdr.de/themen/panorama/8/soldaten_misshandelt accessed May 11, 2008. 
231 A probation longer than one year equals an absolute discharge. Whether the verdict was again 
appealed is presently unknown to the author.  
232  “Schnelle Aufklärung.” ZEIT ONLINE 25.10.2006. 
http://www.zeit.de/online/2006/43/Reaktionen accessed May 11, 2008. 
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inherent calls for harsh consequences were a logical consequence. The fact that it was a 
lime field rather than a graveyard may be of a small consolation but it was revealed after 
the investigations of the public prosecutor’s office. Even if finally no laws were broken 
and again singular culprits where identified, the damage was enormous. The majority of 
the involved soldiers faced court-martial for having endangered the security of the 
German forces in Afghanistan.233 What was even more disappointing was the fact that 
those critics claiming that the Bundeswehr was mentally not ready for such operations in 
Afghanistan seemed to be right. Innere Fuehrung again was in the line of fire. 
It is not the intention here to redefine or turn negative events into positive looking 
aspects. Innere Fuehrung did not prevent these scandals. Yet it is calming and reassuring 
once such scandals were discovered they were taken care of in a thorough civilian 
prosecution as well as it always had additional dire military consequences and 
disciplinary actions ranging from a promotion stop to degradation or in the worst case for 
the person a discharge in addition to the civil law consequences.234   
Because Innere Fuehrung is a process that has started more than five decades ago 
it is obvious that these ideas must continually be applied to military service in difficult 
conditions. In the same way, the scandals have been a reality. The public outcry 
furthermore showed that despite a certain lust for sensations the public cared and still 
cares for its military forces. Simply put it can be stated that Innere Fuehrung works both 
ways. The German military forces today are an organic part of the German democratic 
state and society. They are not a distant functional caste living in a dynastic world of 
privilege. 
 Whether the public openness with the scandals on behalf of the Bundeswehr are a 
result of incorporated Innere Fuehrung or simply the fear of being accused of suppressing 
rights cannot be proved. It does not matter in this case since the mere possibility of being 
                                                 
233 “German Soldiers Face Court-Martial Over Afghan Skull Scandal.” http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2273976,00.html accessed May 11, 2008. 
234 It is disturbing though, that except in the Nagold case the time between the occurrence of the event 
and its coincidental discovery ran one to three years. The investigations, however, where conducted with no 
delay. 
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accused and being prosecuted is a definite sign that one aim of Innere Fuehrung—the 
civil-military relationship under a civilian control—works. 
In the face of the repeated demonstration of Innere Fuehrung at work, the question 
whether the concept is a cold theory that collides with messy reality can be answered in 
the negative. The concept is good and accepted, however it is not a sure-fire success all 
the time. Military life can nonetheless lead to a neglect of this ideal in the hands of those 
who are not wholly committed to the task.  Innere Fuehrung is based upon the values 
incorporated in the German Basic Law. This fact, however, does not imply that the 
Bundeswehr and its concept can correct immediately the failures of education of young 
citizens endured before joining the armed forces. In this case the Bundeswehr cannot be 
the school of the nation as the other German armies before.235 The role for the 
Bundeswehr is to serve the FRG loyally and to reconcile the citizen with military service 
in a manner that produces both military effectiveness within the frame of constitutional 
checks and balances.  
Innere Fuehrung must be the total reality of service in the Bundeswehr.  The 
danger that some kind of militarist or tyrannical figure can somehow pervert the ideal and 
its application is always present, but one cannot also overstate this danger as a rhetorical 
extreme. To be sure, the armies of the other democracies often embrace methods at odds 
with Innere Fuehrung so a certain danger to the German principle lurks in a multinational 
environment.236 In order to avoid relativism Innere Fuehrung relies on a strong 
foundation. Daily contact with reality challenges this concept in a way that it becomes 
more and more the desired reality. 
                                                 
235 “In the late nineteenth century, imperial Germany charged the army with promoting a conservative 
political agenda and forestalling Social Democracy. The German mass army, like many of its counterparts 
in the age of nationalism, was designed to serve as “a great national school in which the officer would be an 
educator in the grand style, a shaper of the people’s mind.” Krebs, Ronald R. “A school for the nation?: 
How Military Service does not build Nations, and how it might.” International Security, vol. 28, no. 4 
(Spring 2004), 85–124.92. 
236 Froehling, Innere Fuehrung,123-124. 
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3.  Philosophy or Concept of Ethics? 
Again the implied question is more than a simple labelling issue. Philosophy or 
ethics are mighty words and the attempt to define them or use them in correlation to 
Innere Fuehrung might lead to distractions, wrong promises or disappointed expectations. 
Even worse the continued use of such terms might create an elitist and hence excluding 
impression. Philosophy, ethics, and morality are often used in combination with Innere 
Fuehrung. Additionally mentioning of values and norms as well as the permanent 
referring to such are dominant characteristics of the central field manual. Furthermore, 
the field of tension between conscience and obedience demands a closer look at this 
question. As described in the previous chapter Innere Fuehrung was needed as an answer 
on the question why people who where considered civilized committed uncivilized acts 
like war crimes.  
“The Germans are very harsh, but their harshness does not stem from hatred. It is 
cold and mechanical, the result of applying a given formula which aims at fulfilling a 
goal they believe in.”237 Such were the words a Greek novelist in 1943 wrote about the 
Wehrmacht soldiers in Greece.238 The formula these Germans were running on did not 
necessarily need fanatism but the belief of racial superiority enabled some of them to 
commit massacres against civilians.239 For the purpose of this study the following 
observation of Mazower is very interesting: “Considerations of justice, morality and 
military honour mingled with widely accepted notions of racial inferiority and social 
deviance in their attitude towards reprisals.”240 
Innere Fuehrung is by far too complex to constitute any simple formula. In other 
words, racism or ideology are not simply substituted by the often cited norms and values 
embedded in the German Basic Law. Although Innere Fuehrung definitely substitutes 
them and tries to prevent a “cold and mechanical” acting of soldiers, it is far more. Innere 
                                                 
237 Mazower, Military Violence, 158. 
238 Ibid., 158. 
239 Mazower refers to the massacre of Komeno in north-western Greece on August 16, 1943.  
240 Ibid., 158. 
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Fuehrung enables soldiers to recognize a situation as described above and equips them to 
deal with it properly since it denies racialism and clearly defines the role “military 
honour” plays in the overall concept. Conflicting duties are made distinguishable from 
seemingly conflicting duties. The problem of conflicting norms in the sense of conflicting 
laws might seem complicated at first look, but it becomes clearer when one considers that 
the possible lack of legal knowledge can be partially substituted by morality. In other 
words, even in daily life not everybody has a master’s degree in law and yet everybody 
usually tries to act in a way that excludes conflict with laws. By referring to its inherent 
values Innere Fuehrung sets the boundaries where soldiers can and should get answers on 
the above cited “considerations of justice, morality and military honour.” What is it, 
though? 
Philosophy as a science does not offer a common agreed definition. A linguistic 
analysis reveals that philosophy can be “a search for a general understanding of values 
and reality by chiefly speculative rather than observational means.” Innere Fuehrung does 
not search for an understanding of values, neither is it speculative. The values are defined 
and not subject to discussion. If one wishes to continue a linguistic analysis one could 
find that philosophy can be “a theory underlying or regarding a sphere of activity or 
thought.” Innere Fuehrung is more than a theory; however, it shows an underlying 
character. The last entry of the dictionary comes close to the character and intention of 
Innere Fuehrung by stating, that philosophy constitutes “the most basic beliefs, concepts, 
and attitudes of an individual or group.”241 Innere Fuehrung, however, is only the vehicle 
that carries the values and the description to incorporate them. 
According to the current central field manual ZDv 10/1 Innere Fuehrung is a 
process that materializes the values and norms of the German Basic Law. It refers to 
ethical, judicial, political, and societal foundations.242 All soldiers must be able at all time 
to live and act with personal responsibility as well as being prepared to take over 
                                                 
241 The linguistic analysis is based upon the entry “philosophy” in: Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary. 11th ed. Merriam-Webster: Springfield, May 2003. 930.  
242 ZDv 10/1 Innere Fuehrung, Chapter 3. 
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responsibility from others for others. In order to do so, they must sharpen their 
conscience and develop moral judgment ability. 243    
Ethics is “the discipline dealing what is good and bad and with moral duty and 
obligation.” Furthermore it is a “system of moral values” and it contains “the principles 
of conduct governing an individual or a group.”244 Such a definition at first sight seems 
perfectly to match Innere Fuehrung. This becomes even more plausible given the 
catalogue of soldierly values based upon the sense of Innere Fuehrung. There exists an 
idea of how the Bundeswehr soldier should be: 
 
 
Figure 7.   Catalogue of Soldierly Values 
Such a definition neglects though the existence of a multitude of exogenous 
factors—like religion or philosophy—that on the one hand contributed to the (moral) 
                                                 
243 Clement and Joeris, 50 Jahre Bundeswehr, 89. The conduct of political education is regulated in a 
different central field manual: ZDv 12/1, “Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr.” no. 508. 
244 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. 429. 
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values while on the other hand such factors still shape the decision making process. 
Although the last decision instance for any individual is his or her conscience, it is clear 
that conscience is not only influenced by values but also to a certain degree by the 
knowledge of laws.      
The danger of philosophy is the exclusive character, while ethic or a concept of 
ethics might be too specific. Innere Fuehrung in this case is a good compromise since it 
combines partly philosophy and ethics. The last entry in the dictionary plainly offers 
“guiding philosophy” for the term ethic. 
Following Hartmann one could argue that Innere Fuehrung is not the guiding 
philosophy of the Bundeswehr but rather a guiding philosophy for the Bundeswehr.245 
For the purpose of this study Innere Fuehrung is the unique institutional culture of the 
Bundeswehr for the Bundeswehr. Giving its openness and its deep anchoring in German 
society it constitutes a business culture that easily enables interaction with other agencies. 
                                                 
245 Hartmann, Innere Fuehrung, 8-9. 
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III.  TRANSFORMATION  
Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful method of 
disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, 
and that is the proper tendency of the art of war. However plausible this 
may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such 
dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of 
benevolence are the worst. 
— Carl von Clausewitz246 
Transformation has become in the ears of many military personnel a buzzword 
with a mostly pejorative character.247 One of the main reasons for this reaction from 
soldiers is the notion that “transformation” inevitably seems to be connected with 
negative change. Without defining the term’s specific content, the linguistic analysis 
already implies that during transformation the status quo changes. In other words, as the 
next lines show, transformation is all about change.248 
However, what makes transformation a suspicious endeavor in the eyes of those 
“living” transformation at the “receiving end” is that they experience it as a remote top-
down approach threatening their own career paths. Moreover, they have an unerring 
sense that traditional organizational branches will be swept away by technological 
advances and that future forces will be simply tailored according to dubious economic 
and political needs.249  
Others fear that, with the transformation agenda propelled by powerful lobbyists, 
in the end only infantry forces will remain. These infantry forces may be expeditionary 
forces mainly skilled with counterinsurgency tactics.250 Current military operations, 
                                                 
246 On War, Book I, I,3. 
247 Hammes, The Sling. 
248For the process of change, USJFCOM offers a good entry. 
http://www.jfcom.mil/about/transform.html accessed March 15, 2008. 
249 Carl Conetta, “Cul de Sac: 9/11 and the Paradox of American Power.” Research Monograph No. 
13. Project on Defense Alternatives. Commonwealth Institute: Cambridge, Ma. 2008. 11. 
250 Steven Mertz and Frank Hoffman, “Restructuring America’s Ground Forces: Better, Not Bigger.” 
The Stanley Foundation. Policy Analysis Brief. September 2007. www.stanleyfoundation.org accessed 
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notably in Afghanistan and Iraq, in combination with the revival of books of the classic 
counterinsurgency era (e.g., works by David Galula) seem to underline such a trend.251 
Because of the discussion whether there are new images of war has direct 
connections to the term Transformation, this chapter starts with an outlook of this 
contemporary discussion. Then in an attempt to grasp the phenomenon Transformation 
and its implications this chapter uses a threefold strategy. The term “Transformation” is 
approached from a short analysis of the contemporary U.S. discussion, the NATO 
discussion and—if it can be called thus—the German approach. 
Another main part of this chapter is dedicated to the status quo of the overarching 
approach presently called EBO, EBAO or CA. Doing so a short look is taken at the 
concept of NCW and its relation and a possible interdependency to this overarching 
approach. 
A.  NEW WARS—ASYMMETRIC THREATS?  
It is undoubtedly true that presently in a world subject to globalization one can 
detect a changed security environment compared to the days of the cold-war period.252 
As this chapter shows, such a changed security environment is often mentioned as driving 
factor for Transformation. Furthermore it is often concluded that war has become a new 
image.253  
                                                 
251 Galula David, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Praeger Security: Westport, Ct, 
London, 1964, 2006. 
252 Yost, NATO Transformed, 7.  
When the author of this paper joined the Bundeswehr in October 1989 in order to fulfill his citizenship 
duties as a conscript the service time was a quarter ago prolonged for three months to a length of eighteen 
month. Almost exactly one month later in the evening of November 9th 1989 the wall in Berlin came down. 
The German Democratic Republic turned to be a chapter in history and together with the end of this large 
field study of “real existing socialism” the end of the cold war was near. As a kind of peace dividend the 
service time for German conscripts was reduced to twelve month in 1990. 
253 Some like Mary Kaldor propose that even wars are new. Kaldor argues, that interstate wars have 
been replaced a mixture of criminal violence with global as well as local actors who are of private or public 
nature.  Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. 2nd ed. London: Polity, 
2007.  
Others like Herfried Muenkler argue that classical interstate wars are too expensive and their preparation is 
too obvious. Therefore—though they still exist—they constitute a discontinued model. However, Muenkler 
does admit that his observations might only be valid for the first half for the twenty-first century. Herfried 
Muenkler, “Neues vom Chamaeleon Krieg.” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ) 16-17/2007. April 16, 
2007. 3–9. 
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In the early 1990s, many scientists as well as politicians seemed completely be 
surprised by the sudden crumbling of bipolarity.254 However it was more than a decade 
later when the still continuing classic inter-state war image finally was shattered.255 
Although the classic and hence to a certain extent symmetric image of war in the form of 
war between states seems to fade away in the face of that ill-fated September morning in 
2001 and its aftermath, a few constants remain.256 The moment the first human beings 
started systematically to impose their will upon others by the use of deadly force, the 
nature of war and its results have not changed much. Therefore it would be more correct 
to speak of new challenges to the security environment. These challenges stem from the 
observation that wars or the purposeful use of violence have become commercialized and 
privatized. 257   
Such observations of a new security environment are real to a great extent; 
nevertheless sometimes the conclusions drawn out of these observations are endangered 
of leading to haphazard decisions in the long run. These decisions involve the 
interdependent complex of equipment, training and education of regular soldiers as 
expression of a states’ monopoly over violence or the exercise of power. Quick efficiency 
oriented decisions might be the short time answers to current problems but they will not 
guarantee a successful future since they might not correlate with strategy or even worse 
the still existing international organizational principle. According to this principle states 
constitute the international actors and these states exercise violence over their own 
territory.258 Whoever questions this principle questions the role of armed forces in 
politics, its civil-military relationship and the connected democratic control and 
                                                 
254 As an example for the then spreading ideas in the field of international relations two widely 
received thinkers shall be mentioned. There is on the one hand Samuel P. Huntington with his rather 
apocalyptic “clash of civilizations” while Francis Fukuyama predicted “the end of history.” Surprisingly 
both ended their titles at least in the beginning of their publication with a question mark.  
255 Dieter Ruloff, and Livia Schubiger, Kriegerische Konflikte: eine Uebersicht. Aus Politik und 
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advocates chaos. Leaving the path of such principles or rules awards those who 
cowardishly attack others with carpet cutters. Privatizing the monopoly of force into the 
hands of mercenaries is the wrong answer on privatized and commercialized violence.259  
It is undoubted that these criminal low cost “warriors” constitute a threat to any 
form of national security and that they contribute to the impression of a new security 
environment. Thus the answer cannot be of the same kind since it would lead to anarchy 
where the survival of the fittest (i.e., not necessarily the strongest) will lead to a further 
downward spiral.260 No sole military Transformation ever will find appropriate solutions 
to the advantage of attack a military relatively under equipped or generally every 
opponent has.261 In other words, the main danger of Transformation lies in the wrong 
application of its technical possibilities. This danger gets bigger, once long term strategic 
necessities and factors are neglected.  
It is true that the most likely threat for the United States for example presently 
does not result from regular forces of another state.262  Denying the new challenges of the 
security environment one could call even counter factualism. Nevertheless, given the 
current oil prices, along with a rising nationalism, Russia might – sooner or later – again 
constitute the well-known old security environment with an able and capable Russia.263 
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B.  TRANSFORMATION—THREE DEFINITIONS 
The major advances in civilization are processes that all but wreck the 
societies in which they occur. 
— Alfred North Whitehead264 
 
Due to the evolving quality and the dynamic character of Transformation, the 
assessment of the three main directions of this term reflects trends and is not definitive. 
Because Transformation can be described as dynamic, static definitions are not of great 
use. Therefore the following paragraphs blend the various definition attempts for 
Transformation in order to show communalities.  
In the view of a European, one aspect is striking: Transformation is seen 
differently on the two sides of the Atlantic.265 The United States takes a more 
technology-oriented approach, while Germany favors a conceptual approach, including 
an emphasis on an overarching security concept.266 
Without judging transformation and its results, there is a common denominator 
that calls for open-mindedness and encourages the spirit of exploring new ideas and 
approaches.267    
1.  The United States 
Transformation can be traced back to the so called last Revolution of Military 
Affairs (RMA).268 Without referring to the present situation in Iraq, a few basic 
principles from the last and still lasting revolution in military affairs can be drawn from 
                                                 
264 As cited in Gergen, Kenneth R. An Invitation, 1. 
265 Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed, 61. 
266 White Paper 2006, 29. 
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the Iraq theatre. The technological cornerstones are the advance of information 
technology, high mobility of forces and precision guided ammunition.269 
Given the information from USFCOM’s website the United States define 
Transformation as follows: 
Transformation is the process of changing form, nature or function. Within 
the United States military, transformation requires changing the form, or 
structure of our military forces; the nature of our military culture and 
doctrine supporting those forces; and streamlining our warfighting 
functions to more effectively meet the complexities of the new threats 
challenging our nation in the new millennium.270 
Furthermore six transformation goals are listed which range from the commonly 
known goals like protection of the homeland and power projection via the explicit 
mentioning of the protection of information networks and making use of such technology 
up to the access and use of space.271 
Additionally in order to create the twenty-first–century forces the method of 
Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) is the main tool.272 Interestingly a 
reference to effects-based planning is given.273 The emphasis on technology is visible.274 
2.  NATO 
Facing the tragic moments of September 11, 2001, and their consequences was 
not the first time the question arose, whether a cold war security alliance seemed to be an 
                                                 
269 Benjamin Schreer, “Die Transformation der U.S.-Streitkraefte im Lichte des Irakkriegs.” 
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appropriate answer for current security challenges.275  Through the various summits since 
2001 the Alliance has recognized this and still puts a premium on its core competence, 
the collective defense role, while at the same time tries to cope with this various new 
challenges resulting from asymmetric warfare.276 Transformation shall deliver the 
appropriate answers. 
It is no coincidence that USJFCOM and NATO ACT are in very close proximity. 
The latter is supposed to convey the ideas of the first into NATO. Differences in some 
fields are marginal. ACT for example sees Transformation as “a sustained and dynamic 
process that develops and integrates new concepts, processes, technologies, and 
organizational designs.”277 
Furthermore in the 2005 document “Understanding NATO Military 
Transformation” published via the ACT website NATO offers the following summary of 
Transformation: 
NATO’s military transformation efforts strive for improved 
interoperability where fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed 
forces, capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the 
battle-space, ensure the Alliance’s relevance—now and in the future. 
Military transformation is as much about mindset as it is about technology. 
It is about understanding the need to embed a culture of innovation and 
managed risk into our thinking.278  
The emphasis of the mindset in a perceived opposition to technology differs from 
the U.S.-version. One might argue that—like the rest of the above definition—this is 
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credited to the chronically unwillingness or inability of the majority of NATO members 
other than the United States to spend more money on their defense budgets.279  
Furthermore the Alliance recognizes three Transformation goals and seven 
Transformation objective areas (TOA). The three Transformation goals are decision 
superiority, coherent effects, and joint deployment and sustainment. These goals are 
supported by the seven TOAs (Information Superiority, NATO Network-Enabled 
Capability, Effective Engagement, Joint-Manoeuvre, Enhanced Civil-Military 
Cooperation, Expeditionary Operations and Integrated Logistics).280 
3.  Germany  
Transformation in the White Paper 2006 is a continuation of the Bundeswehr 
Concept of 2004 which again is related to the Defense Policy Guidelines published in 
2003.281 From the early documents one main argument can be derived; for Germany 
Transformation means that the Bundeswehr has to focus on its core (i.e., military) 
competencies. This economic driven impetus mainly stems from budgetary restrictions 
which to a certain extent are still a result from the reunification.282  
Here most probably lies the biggest difference from the thoughts of the other 
agencies. Budgetary restrictions however have their limitations, too. The observed trend 
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in the aftermath of contemporary military operations, to favor outsourcing of security-
providing and support tasks to private companies constitutes such a deviation. These 
private companies and mercenaries are not bound to the high moral standards that the 
German concept of Innere Fuehrung upholds. Neither do they identify themselves 
sometimes with the mission in a way that is necessary to legitimize such operations over 
all.283 Therefore, this can be seen as a limitation to the German approach to 
Transformation.  
The described further motivation for Transformation in the Bundeswehr however 
does not differ in great detail from those agencies as described before.284 Defining the 
term Transformation is performed over three pages and relates to various NATO concepts 
and summits.285 A short look at the index of the White Paper 2006 reveals that at roughly 
one hundred seventy pages the term “transformation” is used thirty seven times in its 
different variations. The term “training” shows thirty four entries, while Innere Fuehrung 
gets eight hits. “Operations” (82), “European Union” (48), and “NATO” (44) are the top 
three listings. Without further analysis this marks a clear trend that this White Paper once 
more emphasizes the multinational outline of Germany’s interests as well as 
“transformation” has become reality. 
C.  AN OVERARCHING APPROACH 
At the Riga Summit in November 2006, the NATO heads of state and government 
expressed in their “Comprehensive Political Guidance” the Alliance’s need for an 
“effects-based approach,” commonly referred to as EBAO.286 Yet, this topic must be 
seen in relation to terms and developments connected to it. The Effects-Based Approach 
to Operations addresses the strategic level in order to combine all available capabilities of 
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Transformation.” www.luftwaffe.de accessed March 8, 2008. 
285 Ibid., 38-42. 
286 Political Guidance (CPG); Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 
2006 at the Riga Summit: Part 2, par.17. http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm accessed March 
3, 2008. 
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all agencies and organizations acting in a specific engagement space. NCW addresses by 
definition mainly the tactical level of analysis. 287 These terms are part of a key concept 
for NATO for the transformation of the allied forces in order to operate successfully in 
the new strategic environment.288  
Besides the status quo of EBAO in NATO, a particular view is directed towards 
Germany. Because EBAO emphasizes the interagency approach, the different business 
cultures of the various agencies must be taken into account. For the purpose of this paper 
the construct of Innere Fuehrung is considered as the military equivalent of an 
organization’s business culture.  
This chapter examines, whether other approaches to strengthen the mental 
backbone of military forces and their roots in society, such as the German concept of civil 
military relations namely Innere Fuehrung, lead to a different perception of EBAO as a 
rather strategic concept. 
1.  EBO, EBAO or NCW? 
It is no surprise or coincidence that the two headquarters (NATO ACT 
/USJFCOM) are collocated. The impetus for the last RMA came from the U.S. and made 
its development via “Desert Storm” 1991 to its preliminary climax in the “Operation Iraqi 
Freedom” 2003. Information and the timely distribution for crucial information were the 
main driving factors for this RMA. Especially in the U.S. the trend towards the 
                                                 
287 Network Centric Operations or for example the German version NetOpFue (Vernetzte 
Operationsfuehrung), which is an evolution to NCW but still based on the ideas of the advantage of a net 
formed out of soldiers who can act simultaneously as sensors and effectors. Another hint for the connection 
can be found in the Riga CPG in par. 17, where there is a reference to “enhancing situational awareness, 
timely operational planning and decisionmaking, improving links between commanders, sensors and 
weapons” which actually is the core of NCW. Ibid. Part 2, par.17. The discussion about RMA, 
Transformation, NCW and NetOpFue from a German perspective can be found at Collmer, Sabine. “Der 
flexible Soldat: Vom Landesverteidiger zum Soldaten im Einsatz.” In: Wiesendahl (ed.), Innere Fuehrung. 
139–153.147–148. 
288 Although surely more in depth documents exist, the “ACT Trifold” as of November 2007 is 
unclassified and gives an understandable overview of the concept of the Alliance’s 
Transformation.http://www.act.nato.int/media/5-Multimedia/Doclibrary/trifoldfall07.pdf accessed February 
28, 2008. A deeper analysis can be found at: Meyer zum Felde, Rainer. From NATO’s Civil-Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC). 55–75. 
 79
information age and its implications was eagerly and early applied to military forces.289 
Without referring to the present situation in Iraq, a few basic principles from the last and 
still lasting revolution in military affairs can be drawn from the Iraq theatre. The 
technological cornerstones are the advance of information technology, high mobility of 
forces and precision guided ammunition.290 However, as for this paper the U.S. 
interpretation of EBAO—as a developed form of Effects Based Operations (EBO)—is 
only considered in part.  
The comparison of the definitions strikingly revealed that especially the U.S. 
interpretation of revolution in military affairs as well as transformation places, from a 
non-American perspective seen, too great an emphasis on the hegemony of 
technology.291 This might be credited to a certain extend to the perception, that 
Americans tend to have a more open attitude towards the use of technology.292 
In 2002 Edward A. Smith published a book with the title Effects Based 
Operations, where he described the state of the art of the contemporary U.S. way to fight 
wars and how to organize future forces.293 The presented ideas based on the successful 
Desert Storm campaign and the modifications as applied over time through USJFCOM. It 
then seemed that EBO are a form of applied NCW not only in war but also in peace and 
crisis. This U.S. centered view was based on the assumption, that four instruments of 
(U.S.) national power exist, which would apply the many sources of national power. 
These instruments where composed out of four different areas, the so-called DIME 
(diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) spectrum, while the source stemmed 
from the PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information) 
domains. The idea of a systemic approach was the underlying basic assumption: links and 
                                                 
289 Leonard G.Litton, “The Information-Based RMA and the Principles of War.”   
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Litton.html accessed March 8, 2008. 
 290 Schreer, “Die Transformation der U.S.-Streitkraefte im Lichte des Irakkriegs.” http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=680 accessed March 8, 2008. 25. 
291 Vego, Milan N. Effects-Based Operations: A critique.  
292 Victoria de Grazia,. Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th-Century Europe. 
Cambridge, Ma et al.: Harvard University Press 2005. 286–287. 
293 Edward A. Smith, Effects Based Operation (EBO). 
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nodes of the social net where the points to apply power in order to create effects. Close 
connections to the (U.S.) intelligence community were obvious. Despite its attractiveness, 
for an Alliance of sovereign nation states such an approach had a genetic birth defect, 
since it was tailored to the use of force of one single state, with limited need for 
arrangement between the entities of the DIME-spectrum. In addition to a strong executive 
power the dominant military component saw less need for information interagency with 
other less equipped military. 
As a consequence NATO started to emphasize the comprehensive element and the 
interagency with other actors in the engagement space. How one should imagine the 
NATO version of EBO was presented in 2005 in the CAFJO, the Concepts of Alliance 
Future Joint Operations. This concept was revised in February 2006 and found its 
manifestation in the CPG endorsed in Riga. Some terms used in the CAFJO differ 
slightly, while others especially where there is a political need for arrangement between 
the states sound different. The DIME spectrum for example is replaced by the PMEC 
(political, military, economic, civil) term.  
Basically, the ideas behind both versions (EBAO/EBO) are very similar. Both are 
visions, both are systemic approaches with the need for a holistic view of the engagement 
space and both are based on the assumption, that information superiority will lead to 
decision superiority which finally will lead to a coherent deliverance of adjusted effects. 
Furthermore, both need a network, a physical one for the information exchange as well as 
a mental one. 
Since EBAO and NCW are often mentioned simultaneously a brief description of 
the relationship between these two terms is needed. One discriminator is the level each 
term addresses. EBAO addresses the strategic level, while NCW and its variations are the 
technical backbone of the before mentioned approach, the net were everybody is a sensor 
and effector at the same time. Critics are attracted by this combination since for one part 
of them the technological difficulties are way to big to overcome while the other portion 
of critics sees in this the total control of each single soldier. This in turn would degrade 
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the soldier into a simple bullet fired at will of a general far away from the scene.294 With 
this quality NCW reaches deep into the tactical level.   
Yet this does not imply that NCW is mainly about technical specifications and 
EBAO mainly on the conceptual level. Neither does it qualify the importance of these 
terms. Both are important in order to achieve the before mentioned deliverance of 
coherent effects. They act as the blades of a scissor; it simply does not matter which 
blade cuts the paper first. It is of importance that the design of the scissor enables the 
better cut than two single blades.  
2.  “EBAO After Riga”  
Although any Comprehensive Political Guidance resembles at best a successful 
compromise and often is seen as a tradition of already existing predecessors because they 
are agreed documents, this Riga CPG once more emphasizes the changed security 
environment.295  
Furthermore, these CPG state at various places that the timeline or the horizon for 
the expected answer to the changed security environment for the necessary changes will 
be the “next 10–15 years.”296 This raises the question, whether it is too early to search for 
any results or already to take stock. Given the relative inertia or lethargy of military 
organizations as well as any other governmental organization or even like most NGO’s to 
structural and organizational changes, it is amazing, that some parts of the CPG are 
already begin to work out. Yet it is still a long way to go.  
a.  NATO and EBAO  
As for EBAO, the smoke has gone; the “fancy” topic has lost something of 
its newness. Roughly sixteen months after the CPG it can be assumed, that these ideas for 
such an approach have taken roots in the various headquarters and first steps are 
                                                 
294 Jim Storr, “A Critique of Effects-Based Thinking.” RUSI Journal 150, December 2005, London. 
32-35. www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/ebo.htm accessed April 14, 2008. 
295 CPG, Riga. part 2, no. 4 and no. 5. 
296 Ibid., introduction no. 1, part 1 no. 2 and part 3 no.16.  
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undertaken. It is not surprising that especially air forces are more open to the changes 
EBAO might and NCW will bring to military structures since it is about communication, 
openness, speed and a timely situational picture.297 All of these are domains modern air 
forces usually claim as their trademark.298 The Joint Air Power Competence Centre 
where many NATO air forces try “to provide timely and innovative advice” in matters of 
air power, for example is very active in spreading the EBAO-thoughts.299   
Although not directly sponsored by NATO, significant milestones in 
turning EBAO into reality are the USJFCOM sponsored Multinational Experiment 
(MNE) Series.300 Throughout this series, the main problem areas of EBAO in a 
multinational environment gradually turned out. Among others, these are timely and 
simultaneous planning, communication abilities such as a common communication 
platform, a technical as well as a “spiritual” one. These valuable experiments and their 
national variations have shown that the focus on business cultures becomes more and 
more important. 
Although as seen today the various organizations work more or less 
simultaneously in the same security environment, it will remain an illusion to coordinate 
at all time the actions in an efficient way. Effective might be, but is this still the desired 
outcome of those who dictate that there is a war “light” in the sense of the illusion of a 
controllable blow and hence it is possible to make a surgical use of deadly force?  
                                                 
297 A typical product for the positive reception of Transformation by air forces in general is the flyer 
of the Luftwaffe with the title “Transformation.” Although made for a broader distribution it still manages 
to explain the connection between Transformation, NetOpFue (German version of NCW) and the mission 
the Luftwaffe has as a part of the Bundeswehr. The Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, General 
T. Michael Mosley gives a strong summing up for the role and quality of air power in his December 2007 
CSAF White Paper.   
298 Lieutenant General Stieglitz, Klaus-Peter. “The Luftwaffe of Tomorrow.” Luftwaffe 2005: The 
German Air Force, Today and Tomorrow. St. Augustin: CPM Forum, 2005. The Chief of Staff of the 
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298 Lieutenant General Stieglitz, Klaus-Peter. “The Luftwaffe of Tomorrow.” 
299  JAPCC Web site: http://www.japcc.de/mission.html accessed March 6, 2008.The JAPCC is 
located in Kalkar, Germany. 
300United States Joint Forces Command web site 
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b.   Germany and EBAO 
EBAO addresses the strategic level in order to combine all available 
capabilities of all agencies and organizations (military and non-military) acting in a 
specific engagement space. This requires a holistic view, where coherent planning across 
all agencies (military and non-military) is executed throughout the whole operation and 
hence automatically raises the question of interagency cooperation and the respective 
competencies between the various agencies that by nature have different business 
cultures. Therefore, the “business culture” of the Bundeswehr, the concept of Innere 
Fuehrung acts as case study.301 
The same developments as seen in NATO concerning the reception of the 
idea can be seen in Germany. Officers of the Luftwaffe for example have contributed in 
various articles towards the topic as well as the Luftwaffe was the first branch to develop 
conceptual documents which were signed by the Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe in spring 
2007, only a few months after the CPG were endorsed in Riga. 
EBAO, however, is more than a mere military concept. It also involves 
non-military agencies of national power and thus it involves other business cultures. 
Another focus of this paper therefore is how the respective business cultures can 
successfully interact.  Since this thesis is limited in pages, the sole examination and 
depiction of Innere Fuehrung must answer the question, where there might be intersection 
for such an interagency of business cultures. The ZDv 10/1 in its number 634 demands 
that working in a multinational environment all members of the Bundeswehr doing so 
have to be familiar with organizational principles and the business cultures of military 
forces of other nations as well as of those of non governmental organizations.302 
Here might further future research of other business cultures help to illuminate the 
path all agencies of national power might have to go. This section examines whether 
                                                 
301 The idea of Innere Fuehrung as a business culture of the Bundeswehr where it creates a corporate 
identity can be tracked back in parts to the “mental father” Wolf Count Baudissin (1907–1993). A more 
detailed description of the of connection how an assembly of ethical thoughts can lead to a business culture 
can be found at Elmar Wiesendahl, Innere Fuehrung, 17–19. 
302 ZDv 10/1. No. 634. 
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Innere Fuehrung remains valid despite changes in technology and the emergence of new 
operational requirements, including interagency cooperation with different organizations. 
As Chapter IV shows Innere Fuehrung puts an emphasis on the soldier as a human being 
responsible for fulfilling his moral and legal obligations. 
D.  EBAO, TRANSFORMATION AND THE GERMANS—A PRELIMINARY 
CONCLUSION 
This section examined the status quo of the Effects-Based Approach to 
Operations (EBAO) and the framework within the Alliance seeks to realize its three 
transformation goals. Transformation and EBAO are intertwined. The characteristic 
assumption of the vision called EBAO is that all available resources are used in the most 
efficient and effective way possible. In its origins EBAO addresses mainly the military 
instrument; the “M” in PMEC.  Unfortunately here lies some danger; recent operations 
showed that the “M” is capable of delivering effects that lead to a favorable situation but 
not to an end state. Here all the other instruments, the “P,” “E” and “C” are required. In 
order to guarantee the success of such an approach the guidance in order to make really 
use of all instruments must be in the hand of the respective politicians. This is as well a 
question of legitimacy as of practicality, since it is hardly imaginable, that over the entire 
operation the other elements with the culture of risk avoidance will be led by the one 
element with the completely opposing business culture: risk management. 303  
Yet in this context the basic reason for the appliance of military power as politics 
continued in the Clausewitzian sense should never be forgotten. War, or to be more 
modern, the use of kinetic force, must at all times remain the ultima ratio, the very last 
resort.  Military power is no end in itself, nor can it be used isolated for a longer time, its 
use must be careful since war is always costly and never effective for all parties.304 An 
enhanced efficiency and effectiveness must not lead to an improper use of the military 
instrument.  However, it must be credible for any opponent that the use of military force 
                                                 
303 The usage of the word “operation” is for most Germans yet another indicator for its military 
origin. 
304 Harper, American Visions, 29.  
Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis, 78.  
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is an option. The same way an altered security environment demands a flexible use of all 
available instruments. This contradiction is the split; future research will have to answer.  
The White Paper 2006 clearly states the role of Germany as an international actor 
with distinct interests. Once more Germany explicitly reassures its neighbours and allies 
the values and goals of German security policy. Security for Germany is a multinational 
and multilateral approach. The three determining organizations are the United Nations, 
the European Union and NATO.305 The future lies in the approach of a so called 
networked security, wherein network here has a different meaning than among U.S. 
technocrats in uniform. In order to reach such structures the military forces have to be 
transformed as outlined in the Bundeswehr Concept as of August 2004. This 
transformation is in full swing. 
Given the above mentioned strict adherence to NATO as “cornerstone of 
Germany’s future security and defense policy” and its role as “link between two 
continents” it is of less surprise that the way Transformation as seen in NATO does not 
differ to a large extent from the way Transformation is seen in Germany. Yet the 
construct of Innere Fuehrung helps to prevent Transformation from becoming to 
technology oriented since it points out the importance of the human being in the whole 
process. 
Nevertheless, this chapter concludes that a mere combination of copies of military 
operational art of the past with current and future technological military capabilities at 
best will lead to short-term operational success. Therefore, Transformation is not only 
about budgetary restrictions fostering creativity; it is—or mainly should be- about 
strategy, corresponding concepts and human beings. The danger of neglecting strategy or 
the inner cohesion of democratic armed forces is immanent and counter-productive. 
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IV.  INNERE FUEHRUNG TODAY 
Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. … For 
mercenaries are disunited, thirsty for power, undisciplined, and disloyal; 
they are brave among their friends and cowards before the enemy; they 
have no fear of God, they do not keep faith with their fellow man; they 
avoid defeat just so long as they avoid battle; in peacetime you are 
despoiled by them, and in wartime by the enemy. 
— Niccolo Machiavelli306 
 
This study embodies the profound belief that, despite astonishing technological 
possibilities, the emphasis in the art of war still remains on the quality of human 
beings.307 Only well educated and trained individuals who serve their democratic society 
as citizens in the best sense and regular forces are able to defend this society with its 
constitutional principles and values. Still this stricture affords no absolute guarantee for 
success or prevention of war crimes.308  
With the above in mind, this chapter examines the military culture of the 
Bundeswehr based on Innere Fuehrung, as directed by the German Basic Law, and points 
out where transformation might have its limits for the Bundeswehr. One aim of this 
chapter then is to determine whether the Bundeswehr still follows its own guiding 
principles or if in the face of Transformation Innere Fuehrung has become a mere mask 
for public relations. 
This chapter illuminates the close relationship of Innere Fuehrung and the 
Bundeswehr as a conscript force, in view of the fact that conscripts play a vital 
                                                 
306 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince. George Bull, (trans.). London et al.: Penguin, 1999. 40.  
307 Such an attitude however, is not a reflection of hostility toward the use of technology for military 
purposes as one could observe at German officers throughout centuries. Walle, Heinrich, 
“Technikrezeption der militaerischen Fuehrung in Deutschland.” In: Peter H. Blaschke, (ed.). De Officio: 
Zu den ethischen Herausforderungen des Offizierberufes. 2nd completely revised edition. Leipzig: 
Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2000. 319–338.   
308 This study does not refer in detail to the various uses and shapes of contractors in times of 
outsourcing of tasks that are not considered genuine militarily. Not all contractors are mercenaries in the 
sense of this study. For the purpose of this study mercenaries are those members of private companies who 
pursuit rather robust security tasks including the use of armed force. In other words, tasks that one expects 
to be in the hand of regular forces exercising a state’s monopoly over force.     
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democratic role in the life of the armed forces, owing in part to the anti democratic record 
of German soldiers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.    
As the previous chapter has shown Transformation is not only related to the latest 
technological advancements. Strategy and ideology are still playing an important role as 
corrective factor. Limitations to Transformation result from well exercised civil-military 
control as well as the thoughtful use of military power respectively the role of military 
force in the political process as the “ultima ratio.”   
The danger is that the transformation of today’s military forces, which is an 
undoubted necessity based on a changed security environment and budget restrictions, 
might end up in a perverted mockery. Such tendencies can clearly be seen in the use of 
modern mercenaries, which at first glance seem to be cheaper than regular forces, but are 
definitely beyond political control. Outsourcing of the monopoly of power has its limits. 
Therefore Machiavelli and his reflections on mercenaries remain entirely relevant today. 
A.  TRANSFORMATION AND INNERE FUEHRUNG—A 
CONTRADICTION? 
As defined before, Transformation for the German Armed Forces has the purpose 
to create a “capable, modern and highly motivated” Bundeswehr that is able to fulfill its 
tasks as instrument of German security policy in a “security environment [that] has 
altered fundamentally.”309 In other words, it is often assumed that Transformation has the 
only goal to transform the Bundeswehr from cold war armed forces with the main 
objective of defending the own or the territory of allies into a strictly efficient 
Einsatzarmee—expeditionary forces. Forces of a kind, where the fighting spirit and the 
need to apply deadly force and at the same time the recognition of the possibility to die is 
more important than the moral fiber Innere Fuehrung. Even worse, Innere Fuehrung in 
this connotation is regarded as hindering the qualities required for combat.310      
Despite the challenges resulting from the contemporary security environment and 
a changed society, one should not forget that this concept was introduced more than five 
                                                 
309 White Paper 2006. 4–5. 
310 Juergen Rose, Kaempferkult. http://www.linksnet.de/artikel.php?id=1517 accessed March 1, 2008. 
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decades ago at the time of the reintroduction of conscription in West Germany and in the 
wake of the Wehrmacht in National Socialism. The skeptics of Innere Fuehrung were 
wrong in the past as they are wrong today as concerns the ideals that undergird the 
democratic role of the Bundeswehr.311 
As one can see today, there exist three groups with different attitudes towards the 
necessity of change for Innere Fuehrung.312 The first group can be labeled “keepers” 
(Bewahrer) since they consider Innere Fuehrung sacrosanct and therefore consider the 
principles of Innere Fuehrung as untouchable.313  
The second group is the “protectors” (Bewaehrungsposition). They consider a few 
principles of Innere Fuehrung as untouchable and try to keep as much as possible since 
Innere Fuehrung is “tried and tested” (bewaehrt). The “protectors” can be found mainly 
at the MoD level and hence resemble the “official” view and guide line. The current ZDv 
10/1 is expression of their view.314 A certain sense for openness to discussion finds its 
manifestation in those sentences of the FM which acknowledge the existing change. This 
openness however, is contrasted with a clear message: the core of Innere Fuehrung is 
unchangeable.315 The “protectors” however, see that Transformation in the guise of an 
expeditionary force partially questions Innere Fuehrung and some principles. The 
“protectors” try to find appropriate answers, since they see the danger of isolation the 
“keepers” face with their strict rejection of emerging questions as outlined above. 
The third group can be labeled “revisionists.” This group in turn splits into two 
fractions, those who totally oppose Innere Fuehrung in the face of Transformation and 
those who partially want to revise Innere Fuehrung.316 Their motives vary from the 
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revival of the archetypical fighter instead of the citizen in uniform up to a pure technocrat 
view of Transformation while their rejection ranges from total to moderate.317 
A dialogue under the condition of the unchangeable and hence nonnegotiable core 
of the ZDv 10/1 is necessary. It is the task of Innere Fuehrung to give answers and not the 
task of Transformation to dictate answers tailored to its need. Nevertheless, like 
Transformation, Innere Fuehrung is a process and not a product. It must be clear that this 
construct and its set of values are at all times the guideline of each single soldier. There is 
no room for military necessities derived from secret or dubious tasks to block this 
concept or simply undermine it. Using the ZDv 10/1 as spiritual club however, is not 
helpful in order to convince those who obviously have their problems understanding what 
Innere Fuehrung is all about.    
If today’s military tasks differ from those of the cold war and are closer to combat 
then it is a wrong signal to look back into history and search for traditional samples 
where German soldiers last time mostly performed combat operations. Innere Fuehrung 
and the closely related Traditionserlass from 1982 clearly prohibit such ill-fated 
endeavors.318 As a logical consequence this decree is an appendix to the central field 
manual ZDv 10/1. Parliamentary control and the rather typical and healthy modern 
German anti-Nazism reflex will lead sooner or later to public discussion and respective 
consequences. 
The White Paper 2006 dedicates a complete subchapter (3.4) to Innere Fuehrung 
“as the guiding principle of the Bundeswehr.”319 Given the close relationship between 
Innere Fuehrung and the universal conscription, it seems as a logical consequence, that 
the latter forms the next subchapter (3.5).320 Drawing on the other hand the conclusion 
that Innere Fuehrung cannot exist without universal conscription is wrong. Innere 
Fuehrung is a universal principle that applies for all soldiers of the Bundeswehr in order 
to bring “the conditions under which mission-capable military forces operate” “into 
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harmony with the principles of a free and democratic state.”321 However, universal 
conscription is often regarded as the anchor of the armed forces in society, since it 
guarantees public interest in military matters and public identification with the military 
tasks these soldiers have to bear.322  
The White Paper 2006 clearly states the healthy relationship between 
Transformation and Innere Fuehrung: “Especially in a world that has become more 
complex, [Innere Fuehrung] proves an indispensable aid to military personnel in finding 
their orientation.”323 Transformation and Innere Fuehrung are no contradiction as long as 
Transformation and the German Basic Law are not a contradiction. Innere Fuehrung is 
the guiding path the soldiers of the Bundeswehr can relate to in times of change.  This 
principle based on the values enshrined in the German Basic Law more than ever enable 
German soldiers to apply their capabilities in an effective way. Especially in a changed 
security environment the respectful, unexcited, and professional demonstration of the 
incorporation of the values of a successful constitution most probably is more effective 
than any efficient weapon ever might be.324 
Innere Fuehrung can help to create the necessary atmosphere where 
Transformation is accepted as a chance for future forces. Once more it can act as an 
anchor for armed forces in its society.325 It can prove that soldiers are part of this society 
and not distant warriors in the shape of mercenaries.  
The German armed forces are the military forces of the German parliament and 
thus the military forces of the German people. They are no estranged functional military 
caste. Those who wrongly criticize the performance of the Bundeswehr and its limitations 
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in contemporary military operations should therefore aware that such criticism embodies 
an assault on a highly democratic standard and thus sovereign decision of policy.326  
B.  INNERE FUEHRUNG: A GERMAN INHIBITION? 
The founding fathers of the Bundeswehr deemed it necessary to provide the 
soldiers of the young Federal Republic of Germany with a value-based concept, including 
the famous idea of the citizen in uniform as a guideline.327 This idea was fashioned by 
soldiers and civilians who responded to the abuse of the German (and the European) 
citizen in the Wehrmacht and the manner in which German soldiers had seemed to be 
anti-democratic for the century and more preceding the creation of the Bundeswehr. This 
concept can be seen as a fundamental basis of ethics and motivation in the Bundeswehr 
based on the democratic values embodied in the German constitution. Every soldier is 
obligated permanently to reassess his decisions, behaviour and actions based on the 
constitutional and legal aspects of his mission.328 
This German concept of civil-military relations is an approach to strengthen the 
mental backbone of military forces and their roots in society. At the same time it specifies 
the role of the Bundeswehr as an instrument for defence against external threats and 
makes an internal use highly regulated.329 Based on this role of its military force 
Germany easily embraces an overarching approach like EBAO. Innere Fuehrung puts an  
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329 The German Basic Law protects itself in a very effective way. Even if the majority of the German 
parliament votes for the approval of a law the highest German court still can reject such a law if it considers 
it not in accordance with the German Basic Law. A remarkable example one can see in the rejection of the 
Luftsicherheitsgesetz. The court denied the state the possibility to shoot down high jacked aircrafts that are 
possibly used to commit crimes. The right of life of the passengers has a higher priority than for example a 
possible but not yet proven outcome of the terrorist action. 
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emphasis on the citizen in uniform therefore interagency with non-military agencies is 
easier since the “citizen not in uniform” is not that scared at the idea of contact and 
interagency.330 
More than ever one soldier can have remarkable effects on the outcome of a 
whole operation. This raises the question whether the operational concepts are right as 
well as whether the personnel have been properly selected, educated, trained and 
prepared for their mission. The ability to trust in the individual soldier’s competence and 
reliability becomes more and more important. This ability is a logical consequence of 
Innere Fuehrung.  
Whoever claims that Innere Fuehrung prevents the effective soldier i.e. that 
soldier who can fight and kill has on the one hand a rather limited view of soldiers while 
on the other hand definitely has not understood the concept of Innere Fuehrung. This 
concept does not foresee armed civil servants wearing battle dress uniforms. Au 
contraire, this concept deals with a remarkably maturity with the ultimate sacrifice a 
soldier can offer: his or her life.331 Since it continues to see this soldier as a citizen in 
uniform, i.e. a part of society it wants this citizen to think about these consequences and it 
calls for education that might lead to answers. Soldiers of the Bundeswehr always knew 
that there has been more than fun behind driving a tank, flying a jet airplane or sailing the 
seas. Neither were the years of the bipolarity in the shade of multiple nuclear death a cosy 
and safe dreamland nor do the often proclaimed new challenges to the security 
environment change that. It is true though that the concept of Innere Fuehrung prevents 
drilled killer machines without own will and blind obedience.   
 Innere Fuehrung faces new challenges and cannot provide universal or eternal 
answers. Even more than five decades of the existence of the Bundeswehr, the German 
society still is interested in its military forces. They have not become estranged and this is 
partly credited to the successful concept of Innere Fuehrung as well as to the still existing 
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331 ZDv 10/1. No 505 and No. 609. 
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shape of a conscript force.332 However, the current public discussion whether to reinstate 
a medal for bravery maybe in the shape of the Iron Cross might be an indicator that the 
undoubted democratic outline of the Bundeswehr too easily is to be connected with the 
very dark part of German history.333 Discussions about medals and related symbols are 
even older than the Bundeswehr.334 Because Innere Fuehrung is intrinsically based on the 
values of the German Basic Law, it can by no means act as an inhibition. Otherwise the 
German Basic Law would be an inhibition, too. 
The civil-military relationship is not a one-way street. Undoubtedly in a 
successful democracy democratic elected representatives exercise control over those they 
endowed with deadly force. High-level militaries are nevertheless obliged to show their 
fellow citizens the limitations and consequences of military force applied. The 
Clausewitzian reflections on war are not a universal applicable checklist, but they are 
timeless. War is always costly and ultimate. About this ambivalent civil-military 
relationship Strachan wrote: “Politicians need to be militarily informed, and soldiers—
more controversially—need to be politically integrated.”335  
                                                 
332 Hartmann, Erfolge, 123. 
333 R. Mueller, “Dem Tapferen Soldaten” in http://www.faz.net accessed March 7, 2008.  
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http://www.spiegel.de/politik/debatte/0,1518,539842,00.html  accessed March 7, 2008. 
334 Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross. 
335 Strachan, Hew. The Politics of the British Army. Oxford (UK): Clarendon Press. 1997. 2. 
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V. CONCLUSION—IS INNERE FUEHRUNG A SUPERIOR 
CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP?  
The answer to the chapter-titular question here must be a definite “No” because 
Innere Fuehrung more than a concept of leadership. Furthermore a claim that Innere 
Fuehrung is a superior concept of leadership ignores the performance of other military 
forces or bluntly discredits the specific solutions other reputable democracies have found 
to integrate their military forces.  Innere Fuehrung is the German version of civil-military 
control that contributes to a great deal to the business culture of the Bundeswehr. It 
enables leadership on the foundation of the citizen in uniform and hence creates a specific 
style of leadership. This particular style of leadership is based on a respective code of 
behaviour that inevitably leads to a code of conduct. Innere Fuehrung puts a great 
emphasis on the maturity of its citizens who happen or chose to be soldiers.  
Innere Fuehrung has proven its effectiveness in its context. What had not been 
self-evident for German soldiers for the century preceding the foundation of the 
Bundeswehr has now become self evident: The Bundeswehr is the legitimate force of the 
German Parliament; it is integrated in society, and its soldiers are motivated because they 
can identify their task based upon the German Basic Law—which they want to protect 
because this law in turn offers universal protection for those following its principles. 
Innere Fuehrung is a process that has grown over the years and has overwhelmed time 
after time its critics. Open anti democratic tendencies rather sooner than later disqualify 
them facing a military force following the abstract principles of the German Basic Law. 
The short historical analysis in Chapter II provided the necessary background to 
understand why the concept of Innere Fuehrung is more than a concept of military ethics 
or simply a soldierly philosophy. 
The new challenges to the security environment demand, if not new answers, at 
least revised answers how to cope with such challenges. Today’s operations are rather 
conducted in a parallel fashion than in a linear and sequential one. This is credited to the 
various levels of intensity modern conflicts can show today. Military forces share the 
engagement space with a multitude of civilians of governmental as well as non-
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governmental organizations. Especially the later often are prone to a certain dislike of 
soldiers. This stems amongst others from the supposedly different ethical background and 
the derived solutions to solve conflicts. In other words, ethics play in this case a role as 
well two completely diverging cultures. While civilian help organizations prefer the 
culture of risk avoidance military forces usually follow culture of at times robust risk 
management. 
 Innere Fuehrung by its basic construction can help to overcome the perceived 
problem of diverging ethics. As one often can see throughout many recent operations at 
the tactical level is the reliance of civilian organizations on direct or indirect military 
protection. Furthermore military forces are still the only organizations in the world that 
can bring many people and equipment at any place and under almost any condition in a 
short amount of time. 
Therefore, it cannot be a question of concurring interests but rather it is a question 
of mutual supplementation. Limited and declining budgets and the resulting restrictions 
are one driving factor while the present security environment is another factor that calls 
for new approaches. The 2006 NATO Summit in Riga called in its CPG for such a new 
overarching approach. Innere Fuehrung as a rather open and yet mature business culture 
can contribute to such an overarching process as outlined in the Riga Summit.     
A few challenges, however, remain like the present discussion about the burden 
sharing for example in Afghanistan shows. In our media dominated world it has become 
fashionable to follow those who are the loudest or the ones with the most media presence 
and media power. In other words not always he who has reasonable arguments gets heard 
but he who shouts the loudest or in generally the most. Unfortunately those with good 
arguments sometimes get impressed by the volume and are ready to give up positions 
against one’s best knowledge. Instead of remaining steadfast on good reasons they fall for 
the trap of bargaining. Impressing enough the existence of such a situation of bargaining 
is the reward for those who had little than public noise and loud mouthing to offer based 
on their agenda in order to cover own deficiencies.  
The challenge in this case is to agree on a viable strategy before going into action. 
A process constructed like EBAO with the intention of a Comprehensive Approach might 
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help to identify possible problems well ahead of time. Additionally, it could help to set a 
timeframe when the most probable initial military engagement gradually could be 
replaced by the other instruments of national or supranational power. Still, this would not 
constitute a guarantee that readjustments are needed once an operation has started.      
It is in this light that the present sounds are shrieking in some ears. Germany has 
gone a long and remarkable way towards sovereignty after the “total defeat” of the Third 
Reich and the catastrophe that particular regime had brought to the world. Only five years 
after the end of World War II foresighted allies recognized the need for a German 
contribution to defend Europe against Soviet expansionism. To turn this way into a 
success story was only possible together with the allies. It was due to their political and 
financial support in connection with a unique window of opportunity that the West 
German sovereignty was achieved in great parts within a decade after the war. It is true 
that this process was the helped by the German willingness to share the military burden 
of NATO in order to guarantee Europe’s existence.   
In times of a polarized discussion not even surreal seeming themes on rather 
respected platforms are surprising anymore. Still, it is more than disconcerting if some 
figures call for the Germans to give their Bundeswehr a touch of Wehrmacht in a 
prominent forum like the New York Times. Such might be credited to an obscure 
interpretation based on a questionable knowledge of history. What is even more 
disturbing is the willingness of a certain German clientele to go with this discussion for 
reasons one might only speculate. 
 This has not the least to do with fouling one’s own nest or a backwards oriented 
eternal humility or a mental submission posture. The mindset of today’s Germans is very 
different from the mindset of the Germans of the Third Reich. As for the soldiers of the 
Bundeswehr, this was achieved to a great deal by the means and principles Innere 
Fuehrung provides. Killing other people for the sake of international recognition is 
simply not that what the German Basic Law foresees. National maturity is not expressed 
in the numbers of dead soldiers or showing false bravery by taking over dangerous 
missions. Whoever argues that national maturity is expressed that way displays a wide 
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array of intellectual poverty or at least is sure that he or his children are not the ones that 
get killed for—if not dubious but at least questionable—reasons.  
Whoever argues that way shows a frightening inner distance towards his soldiers. 
He does not see soldiers anymore as part of the society, he rather sees soldiers as “sui 
generis,” a condition Innere Fuehrung tried to overcome and successfully has overcome 
at last. Now, one could argue that except for conscripts it is up to the individual decision 
to become a soldier, this might be partially right, however, it would bring soldiers of any 
military force of a democracy in close proximity to mercenaries. Amazingly it happens in 
a time when others seem to embrace those factors that contribute to the prevailing success 
of Innere Fuehrung: the educated soldier who can use the tools of humanities in order not 
to become a mere tool!    
Neither one can turn back time nor is it the intention of this study to be deluded by 
a soothing since simple seeming past. Learning to fight in order not fight was the cold 
war motto for the Bundeswehr. The cold war is over but the motto still seems to make 
sense. The world unfortunately is not the place where people live according to Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative. The political use of soldiers however, is limited.  
Additionally, labeling German soldiers as cowards or as afraid of getting into 
danger is hilarious. No matter how loud a few opinion-makers demand that Germans 
have to kill and have to be ready to be killed in dangerous mission and above that they 
have to learn how to kill and get killed; a few dead German soldiers would not solve the 
crisis of NATO as a few see in Afghanistan. Moreover these people most probably do not 
know or seem to have forgotten that Innere Fuehrung explicitly demands that all soldiers 
have to reflect upon questions of the own death or severe injury as a consequence of an 
operation or as a consequence of being a soldier in general. This is not just lip servicing. 
The Bundeswehr already has had their Gefallene, soldiers killed in action.336  
The world does not get a better place when the number of dead German soldiers 
increases for dubious reasons or wrong strategy. Politicians and other responsible 
decision-makers in democracies throughout the world are asked to come up with better 
                                                 
336 Kuemmel, Gerhard and Leonhard, Nina. “Death, the Military and Society: Causalities and Civil-
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ideas than seeing their soldiers as a dispensable product for political purposes. In the days 
of the cold war the strategy for Germans worth dying for if necessary was nothing less 
than to defend the rights and freedom of Germany or the values as written down in the 
preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty together with their allies.  
It suits Germany well to be a reliable and powerful partner in the alliance or in the 
world in general but it suits Germany also well to remember its past and hence trying to 
act accordingly. Despite a steadily seeming change of paradigm since the 1990s for the 
German society war still remains the “ultima ratio.” This can be traced back to 
devastating consequences the last war caused by Germans had. Once more it must be 
pointed out, today’s Germans are different. That war was not their fault, the responsibility 
to prevent horrible events like that war, however, remains.  
The will of the German society as expressed in the decisions of the German 
Parliament clearly indicates that it is hard to find easy decisions on this topic.337 The 
economic potential of Germany is still strong; however, the inversion of that argument 
that the military power has to be accordingly is not inescapably logic. In times where the 
whole alliance is at stake when the Germans are not ready or willing to kill, other 
solutions to the problems with most probably deeper roots are needed. One such better 
solution might be the consequent following of a Comprehensive Approach or EBAO 
despite the underlying assumption that this might imply the active, i.e. easy use of 
military force in order to pursue foreign policy goals. The use of the Bundeswehr as a 
military force subject to parliamentary decision leads to a different perception of a 
comprehensive approach. EBAO becomes more the rather strategic and holistic concept 
the way it actually is designed. This study is based upon the belief that an interagency 
driven process like EBAO with the background of a Comprehensive Approach is 
necessary. However, there is still a long way to go without knowing how the concept 
finally will be called and how it will look like in detail.338 
  One finding of this paper is that Innere Fuehrung remains valid, despite changes 
in technology and the emergence of new operational requirements since it naturally 
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includes interagency cooperation with different organizations. Innere Fuehrung puts an 
emphasis on the soldier as a human being responsible for fulfilling his moral and legal 
obligations. The soldier’s ability to meet the high demands at every level of modern 
operations is more crucial than ever. Technology gets a supporting role and not the 
central issue. The ability to trust in the individual soldier’s competence and reliability 
becomes more and more important. Another finding is that this ability is a logical 
consequence of Innere Fuehrung correctly applied. Information superiority is enhanced 
by Innere Fuehrung and will automatically contribute towards the desired decision 
superiority, one of the three Alliance transformation goals. Innere Fuehrung is not the 
concept that sends lawyers or political advisors in the field. It is however the concept that 
enables the citizen in uniform to bring his knowledge into effect in accordance with 
military necessities. The question of good or bad, i.e. what is allowed or not must be part 
of the education a citizen already had before becoming a soldier. Innere Fuehrung enables 
and protects this soldier at the same time it helps this soldier to broaden his knowledge 
and attain further education. 
 The range from sources where one can learn what constitutes “good” or “bad” is 
wide. Kant’s Categorical Imperative, the incorporation of (criminal) law or conscience 
coined by religion are only a few possibilities. Because Innere Fuehrung addresses the 
citizen in uniform this concept must reflect society and its foundations. Innere Fuehrung 
does recognize that the values of the German society are derived to a great deal from the 
belief in God.339 The explicit mentioning of the role of military pastors and the spiritual 
welfare and the exercise of religion as an additional domain are proof for such 
reflections.340      
One must not confuse or mix up multiple reasons that inevitably lead to a growing 
dissatisfaction: The momentary lack of suitable equipment, the chronically under 
financing of the Bundeswehr, a pity promotion rate in some areas and the perception of 
transformation as an uncoordinated sequence of rapid changing detachments while at the 
                                                 
339 The preamble of the German Basic Law still starts with the following sentence: “Conscious of 
their responsibility before God and man…” 
http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/parliament/function/legal/germanbasiclaw.pdf accessed May 1, 2008. 
340 ZDv 10/1 Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
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same time being considered a pawn on the international chessboard. These reasons can 
form a combination that fosters doubts and might have decreased motivation. Such a lack 
of motivation however is not credited to the principles of Innere Fuehrung. It is credited 
to Innere Fuehrung that reveals such problems since the soldiers are politically informed 
and they have their possibilities to criticize. They can identify the reasons and they are 
protected from arbitrariness of any kind while articulating them. 
Innere Fuehrung works; in case there is a mismatch between strategy and goals or 
strategy and capabilities it is time for the responsible persons, be they high ranking 
generals or members of parliament to bring the goals as well as the capabilities in line 
again with strategy. Such an obligation to speak up however, does not abolish the 
obligation to do it in the appropriate style. Going public in newspapers might guarantee 
publicity. One should not mix up the intentions of Innere Fuehrung, the “primacy of 
politics” and mere promotion of the publicity of the protagonists and those who want to 
become protagonists.   
Despite some high ranking critics Innere Fuehrung was healthy enough to 
withstand many attacks ranging from simple neglecting to open disgust. The reasons are 
actually simple: Innere Fuehrung incorporates the values of the German Basic Law. It 
thus has become its own reality. Whoever opposes Innere Fuehrung opposes these very 
values and consequently violates these laws.  
This study started with the claim that the term Innere Fuehrung still defies a 
translation into English. In order to close this study an offer for a translation is made. 
This rather personal attempt does not claim universal validity since it solely is based on 
own experiences as well as having had the luxury to write this study. Having served the 
Federal Republic of Germany since 1989 the author was able to see the principles of 
Innere Fuehrung in action. During his basic training the topic Innere Fuehrung was one of 
the first briefings he ever received as a soldier. Throughout the years not only many more   
were to come but he was able to realize based on observation that Innere Fuehrung 
actually constituted the business culture of the Bundeswehr in general and especially in 
the German Air Force. 
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The label “leadership development and civic education” is a useful but somehow 
bulky attempt to come close to the core of this concept. Innere Fuehrung definitely is a 
process to develop leadership and this development is based rather upon education than 
on primarily military training. Innere Fuehrung as characteristic of German civil-military 
relationship protects the soldier and thus gives guidance how to treat these soldiers. 
Therefore one of the main qualities of Innere Fuehrung is the guidance it can give as a 
universal concept where ethics, morale and soldierly philosophy complement one another 
in a harmonic way. It is the guidance how a citizen in uniform can and is supposed to act 
as a responsible soldier in order to defend this society. Where the situation is a map and 
education is the legend, then Innere Fuehrung is the ethical compass that helps to guide 
the way. Why should it not be translated as “Inner Guidance”? 
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